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The Legal Definition of Parenthood: Uncertainty at
the Core of Family Identity
June Carbone*
In 2000, I published a book, From Partners to Parents: The
Second Revolution in Family Law.' In that book, I argued that the
first revolution had dismantled the system of family obligation built
on the ties between adults, and that a second revolution was
rebuilding obligation on the basis of the remaining ties between
adults and children. I then predicted that for the new regime to work
it would be necessary to reexamine the adult ties necessary for
children's well-being.2
In constructing this argument, I thought we at least knew who the
parents were. That is, in reducing the emphasis on adult relationships
such as marriage and dismantling the bright line distinctions between
legitimate and illegitimate children, we would be left with parental
ties defined by biology and adoption. Indeed, I was so confident that
parenthood was a settled category that in the process of declaring that
custody was ground zero in the gender wars'-and in the new regime
based on parental obligation-I did not address the legal definition
of parenthood.4
The definition of parentage-and with it the determination of
which adults receive legal recognition in children's lives-has
become the most contentious issue in family law. Not only are
jurisdictions irreconcilably divided in their approach to parentage,
decisions under settled law in a given county may not necessarily
come out the same way.5 There are two principal reasons for this.
First, ironically, is greater certainty in the determination of biological
parentage. We have an elaborate legal structure based on marriage
designed to manage biological uncertainty. Certain knowledge is
cracking the foundations of these structures. It is one thing to limit
testimony about a woman's infidelity; it is another to bar DNA tests
Copyright 2005, by LOUIsIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor ofLaw and Associate Dean for Professional Development, Santa
Clara University. I would like to thank Alexander Weddle for his research
assistance with this article.
1. June Carbone, From Partners to Parents: The Second Revolution in Family
Law (Columbia University Press, 2000).
2. Id. at 235-41.
3. Id. at 180.
4. Id. at 164-79 (addressing the remaking of fatherhood).
5. For a comprehensive review of recent parentage decisions, see Paula
Roberts, Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP), Truth and Consequences,
Parts 1, I, and III, Paternity Disestablishment in 2004, available at
http://www.clasp.org (last visited on March 27, 2005).
6LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
that conclusively establish that the woman's husband is not the
child's father.6
Second, greater marital instability has undermined the primary
mechanism for recognizing functional parenthood. The stigma
associated with illegitimacy once encouraged pregnant women to
seek a man who "would give the child a name." All but one of the
categories of presumed fatherhood in the original Uniform Parentage
Act rested on the proximity between birth and marriage.7 Once a
man married a woman and assumed the responsibilities of
fatherhood, the combination of the evidentiary rules associated with
the marital presumption and estoppel principles (not to mention the
stigma of divorce) limited the opportunities for escape.8
Perhaps just as critical, the decision to marry was associated with
the assumption of responsibilities to mother and child. Divorce, if it
did occur, was not taken lightly, and post-divorce obligations, to the
extent they were enforced at all, were also seen as obligations to the
continuing mother-child unit. Within this system, spousal support
was more critical than child support.9 Visitation, if it occurred, was
secondary to the custodial determination and the expectation that a
6. Mary R. Anderlik & Mark A. Rothstein, DNA -Based Identity Testing and
the Future of the Family: A Research Agenda, 28 Am. J. L. Med. 215, 22-22
(2002). Anderlik and Rothstein emphasize that we have no reliable indication at
this point as to how many cases exist of misattributed paternity. Their estimates
range from five to thirty percent. Id.
7. Uniform Parentage Act of 1973 § 4.
8. Indeed, if there has been any consistent thrust to the modem law of
parentage, it has been to identify fathers and encourage the equal participation of
both parents in the children's lives. This emphasis on equality, in contrast, for
example, to the maternal presumption, or the historic opposition to joint custody,
makes it more difficult to confer parental standing on adults who play an important,
but unequal role, in children's lives. See Harris, Teitelbaum & Carbone, Family
Law, 643-54 (evolution in thinking about joint custody from the need to have a
single voice of authority to fairness between the parents), 877-99 (courts' difficulty
in dealing with different positions of unmarried mothers and fathers entitled to
shared decision-making power), 911-914 (diversity of stepparent roles) (3rd ed.
2005).
9. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Louisiana Family Law § § 16.02, 16.03,
in Louisiana Civil Code Series (1996).
Louisiana's Civil Law tradition, from its French and Spanish beginnings,
provided for the parental obligation of child support. The Common Law
did not have such an auspicious beginning. The Elizabethan Poor Laws
in England during the 16th century were the initial weak and ulteriorly
motivated attempt to make the father pay the parish.., for child support
given his child ... Louisiana's and continental Codes influenced child
support legislation in the rest of the United States.
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single primary caretaker, not two Parents jointly, would be
responsible for the child's well-being.'
Recent revolutions in family law have remade the basis for
thinking about family obligation. If parental obligation to children
is independent of the adult relationship, then definition of that
obligation must start with the recognition of parenthood. Biological
parenthood, however, may or may not correspond with the
assumption of parental responsibilities, and many of the adults
playing parental roles may not necessarily have a biological
relationship to the child.12 In these circumstances, parental status
becomes contested turf. Yet, uncertainty at the core of the definition
of family produces not only legally contentious cases, but also
confusion in the recreation of the moral obligations of adults. Who
bears and who should bear responsibility for children? If we are not
sure what the legal basis for parenthood is or should be, how can the
law reinforce internalization of appropriate norms of parenthood?
This comment examines how this morass developed and what can
be done about it. In doing so, it compares alternative bases for
parenthood, starting with the marital presumption, biological
paternity, and de facto or functional parents. It then focuses on the
difference between ex ante bases such as adoption versus ex post
determinations, such as those based on in locoparentis. Finally, this
comment considers the extent to which the relationship between the
adults remains important for the definition of parenthood.
This examination untangles the different meanings of parenthood.
Many parentage cases address parentage as a category necessary for
the determination of custody or support. This comment concludes
that parentage should be, first and foremost, about identity.
Parenthood is, now and historically, the legal category that answers
the question: To which family does this child belong? 3
10. Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking ParenthoodAs An Exclusive Status: The
Need For Legal Alternatives When The Premise Of The Nuclear Family Has
Failed, 70 Va. L. Rev. 879, 900 (1984). See also Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964
(Md. 1986).
11. Carbone, supra note 1, at 48-49 (emphasizing the dismantling of the
system based on marriage and legitimacy).
12. See, e.g., Kim A. Feigenbaum, The Changing Family Structure:
Challenging Stepchildren's Lack ofInheritance Rights, 66 Brook. L. Rev. 167, 173
(2000) (noting that more Americans live in step-families than in traditional
families).
13. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Are You My Mother? Conceptualizing
Children's Identity Rights in TransracialAdoptions, 2 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol'y
107, 128 (1995).
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I. WHAT IS THE ORIGIN OF PARENTHOOD? A TALE OF Two
CATEGORIES
Divorce remakes the terms on which families go forward.14 In
doing so, the termination of custody and support ordinarily starts with
the legal assignment of parental status. But what is the origin of
parenthood itself? Consider these two divorce cases that use
radically different doctrinal approaches to address the issue.
A. Category 1: Ex Post Review
The Connecticut divorce case of Doe v. Doe" involved a custody
dispute over a fourteen year old girl, who was conceived by artificial
insemination between the husband and a surrogate mother. 6 The
surrogate entered the hospital using Mrs. Doe's name. She entered
Mr. and Mrs. Doe as the child's parents on the birth certificate, and
the Does raised the child from birth. No adoption proceedings were
initiated.'7 The Does separated when the child was seven. They
initially agreed to a temporary joint custody order, which provided
that the child's primary place of residence would be with Mrs. Doe.'8
Two and half years later, though, when the child was ten, the Does
informed the court that the child "was not a child of the marriage."19
Each party sought custody, and the father asserted that he was the
child's only legal parent.
The Connecticut Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider Mrs. Doe's custody claims as a non-parental
third party under a best interest test. Although Connecticut statutory
law recognized a presumption in favor of parental custody rebuttable
14. See The Post Divorce Family: Children, Parenting, and Society, (Ross
Thompson & Paul Amato eds., Sage Publications, 1999). "When a marriage ends,
the family growing out of that marriage continues. While the structure of the family
changes with divorce, the family itself does not disappear." Id.
15. Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).
16. Id. at 405-09. The child was born on April 30, 1983. The "Does"
separated in early 1991, and initially agreed to temporaryjoint custody order. The
child's primary place of residence was with Mrs. Doe. Two and a half years later,
however, the parties informed the court that the child was not "a child of the
marriage," and both husband and wife sought custody. They then secured
termination of the parental rights of the surrogate and her husband in a separate
proceeding on grounds of abandonment in September of 1995. Id.
17. Id. at 408.
18. Id. at 407-09.
19. Id. at 409.
20. Id. at 408.
1298 [Vol. 65
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by a showing of detriment to the child,2 the court nonetheless
concluded that:
As these authorities make clear, the presumption does not
mean that the nonparent must, in order to rebut it, prove that
the parent is unfit. It means that the parent has an initial
advantage, and that the nonparent must prove facts sufficient
to put into issue the presumed fact that it is in the child's best
interest to be in the parent's custody. Once those facts are
established, however, the presumption disappears, and the
sole touchstone of the child's best interests remains
irrespective of the parental or third party status of the adults
involved. In that instance, then, neither adult-the parent nor
the third party-enjoys any advantage or suffers any
disadvantage as a result of his or her parental or third party
status."
The court then concluded that the presumption had been rebutted by
the fact that the plaintiff and defendant lived together and nurtured
the child, they had shared joint custody through seven years of
litigation, and the child's primary residence had been with the non-
parent. The almost-fifteen year old's best interests were with
continuation of the joint custody award, which established her
primary residence with Mrs. Doe.
This case left the legal definition of parenthood undisturbed while
it used a best interests analysis to reconcile the child's interests with
the facts the Does had created. The Connecticut approach employs
after-the-fact decision-making, which takes the child as it finds her
and gives deference to her needs. It is consistent with the calls of
many of the most prominent family law theorists for a child-centered
jurisprudence,24 and with the ALI's recent efforts to recognize
parenthood by estoppel.25 Is it a model for custody decision-making?
Most probably not-if the Supreme Court's decision in Troxel v.
Granville6 is to be taken at face value. The Connecticut Supreme
Court, in response to Troxel's affirmation of parental rights under the
United States Constitution, overruled the standard in Doe, holding:
21. Id. at 454.
22. Id. at 455.
23. Id. at 456.
24. See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Reconsidering the Criteria for Legal
Fatherhood, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 461; Barbara B. Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A
Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1747 (1993);
James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy Of Children's Existing Rights In State Decision
Making About Their Relationships, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 845 (2003).
25. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations, § 2.03(1)(b) (2002).
26. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
2005] 1299
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[T]he protected fundamental right of a parent to make child rearing
decisions mandates that where a third party seeks visitation, that third
party must allege and prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a
relationship with the child that is similar in nature to a parent-child
relationship, and that denial of the visitation would cause real and
significant harm to the child.27
Would Doe come out differently under such a standard? It is
impossible to know. The court might well find that loss of the child's
primary residence at an age (nearly fifteen) when she is old enough
to have strong pref-rences about the matter would constitute "real
and significant harm."2 But then in a subsequent case, the decision
would presumably be made at the time of the parties' initial
separation, before the seven years of litigation that proved critical in
Doe. Under this type of after-the-fact decision-making, parental
status remains uncertain until the day of the decision.
B. Category 2: Ex Ante Creation of Parental Status
In the infamous California case of Buzzanca v. Buzzanca,2 9 the
intended parents, John and Luanne Buzzanca, arranged for the
creation of an embryo through donated egg and sperm. The parental
status of the donors was terminated when they surrendered their
parental rights in accordance with California law.3" The embryo was
then implanted in a gestational surrogate, who bore no genetic
relationship to the child.3 Shortly before the child's birth, Mr.
Buzzanca sought a divorce, maintaining that there were no "children
of the marriage."32 Mrs. Buzzanca, in contrast, argued that the child
should be treated as theirs, and requested child support from Mr.
Buzzanca. The trial court, after accepting the parties' stipulation that
the gestational surrogate and her husband had surrendered their
parental rights, concluded that the child, Jaycee, had no legal parents,
and Mr. Buzzanca could not accordingly be held liable for support.33
27. In re Joshua S., 796 A.2d 1141, 1156 (Conn. 2002).
28. Id.
29. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. App. 4th 1998).
30. Id. at 285, n.7; Cal. Fam. Code § 7613(b) (providing"[t]he donor of semen
provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a
woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural
father of a child thereby conceived.").
31. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 at 282.
32. Id.
33. Id. The Court of Appeal commented that the trial court
"had-astonishingly-already accepted a stipulation that neither she nor her
husband were the 'biological' parents." On the issue of Mrs. Buzzanca's parental
status, the trial court also stated, "[s]o I think what evidence there is, is stipulated
to. And I don't think there would be any more. One, there's no genetic tie between
1300 [Vol. 65
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The court of appeal reversed. The court stated bluntly, "Let us
get right to the point: Jaycee never would have been born had not
Luanne and John both agreed to have a fertilized egg implanted in a
surrogate."34 The result was a ruling that established parenthood on
the basis of intent alone. The Buzzanca court concluded:
Even though neither Luanne nor John are biologically related
to Jaycee, they are still her lawful parents given their
initiating role as the intended parents in her conception and
birth. And, while the absence of a biological connection is
what makes this case extraordinary, this court is hardly
without statutory basis and legal precedent in so deciding.
Indeed, in both the most famous child custody case of all
time,35 and in our Supreme Court's Johnson v. Calvert6
decision, the court looked to intent to parent as the ultimate
basis of its decision.37 Fortunately, as the Johnson court also
noted, intent to parent "correlate[s] significantly" with a
child's best interests 3 .... That is far more than can be said
for a model of the law that renders a child a legal orphan.3 9
Luanne and the child. Two, she is not the gestational mother. Three, she has not
adopted the child. That, folks, to me, respectfully, is clear and convincing evidence
that she's not the legal mother." Id. at 283.
34. Id. at 282.
35. The court references, "1 Kings 3: 25-26 (dispute over identity of live child
by two single women, each of whom had recently delivered a child but one child
had died, resolved by novel evidentiary device designed to ferret out intent to
parent)." Id. at 293, n.19.
36. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
37. The court notes, "[w]hile in each case intent to parent was used as a
tiebreaker as between two claimants who either had or claimed a biological
connection, it is still undeniable that, when push came to shove, the court employed
a legal idea that was unrelated to any necessary biological connection." Buzzanca,
72 Cal. Rptr. at 293, n. 20.
38. Citing Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782-83 (1993) (quoting Shultz,
Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 297, 397 (1990)).
39. The court notes, "[i]t is significant that even if the Johnson majority had
adopted the position of Justice Kennard advocating best interest as the more flexible
and better rule, there is no way the trial court's decision could stand. See 851 P.2d
at 788 (Kennard, J., dissenting)." Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 293, n.2 1. The court
further reasoned because Luanne had cared for Jaycee since infancy and that "she
is the only parent Jaycee has ever known" that it would be "unthinkable ... for
Luanne not to be declared the lawful mother under a best interest test." Id. With
respect to the father, the court notes that he "would not be the first man whose
responsibility was based on having played a role in causing a child's procreation,
regardless of whether he really wanted to assume it." Id.
2005] 1301
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Does this case stand for the principle that parenthood can be
established by intent alone?4' The outcome is in doubt. Following
Buzzanca, state trial courts began to issue declaratory judgments
finding parenthood on the basis of intention.4' The Buzzanca court,
however, limited its ruling to married couples who engineer the
creation of a child,42 and in the first appellate test of the post-
Buzzanca rulings, the court of appeal rejected the idea of parenthood
by contract.43 The case is pending before the California Supreme
Court."
Resolution of the Doe and Buzzanca cases was an easy matter on
the facts. In both cases, the parties to the dispute were a married
couple who had engineered the birth of a child. In both cases, one of
40. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood By Pure Intention: Assisted
Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 Hastings L.J. 597
(2002).
41. In these cases, the intended parents sought declaratory judgments referred
to as Uniform Parentage Act or "UPA declarations," recognizing the intended
parents as the legal parents while the child was in utero. The court in Kristine H.
v. Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Cal. App. 2d 2004), rev'd and superceded by,
Kristine Renee H. v. Lisa Anne R., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668, 97 (Cal. 2004), observed:
Amici curiae the Southern California Assisted Reproduction Attorneys
(SCARA), the Family Pride Coalition and the Los Angeles Gay and
Lesbian Center (collectively, SCARA) represent that prebirth judgments
have been issued for "roughly five years,"... SCARA represents to the
court in its letter brief that "hundreds of families have come to rely on
these judgments in the years since Buzzanca." According to SCARA, it
"quickly polled six of its members who report that an adverse ruling in
this case will potentially affect some 750 births.
From there, SCARA concludes that "thousands of cases in California" are
potentially affected by a decision voiding either prebirth agreements and/or the
declaration of parentage. SCARA, however, provides no corroborating documents
or data to support this conclusion.
42. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287, n. 11. The Buzzanca court stated:
In the present case we are dealing with a man and woman who were
married at the time of conception and signing of the surrogacy agreement,
and we are reasoning from a statute, Family Code section 7613, which
contemplates parenthood on the part of a married man without biological
connection to the child born by his wife. Whether section 7613 might be
applied by a parity of reasoning, as we do today to a married couple, to a
nonmarried couple is not before us and we will not speculate as to the
answer.
Id.
43. Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123, 133-34. "A determination of
parentage cannot rest simply on the parties' agreement .... Therefore, the
judgment based on the parties' stipulation was in excess of the family court's
jurisdiction and of no legal effect." Id.
44. The appellate court did, however, recognize the parental standing of the
unmarried partner on the basis of other state doctrine. Id. at 138-43 (recognizing
the unmarried partner as a presumed parent, who welcomed the child into her
household and held out the child as her own).
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the parties was trying to use legal uncertainty to gain an advantage
over the other party, with the husband in Doe denying his wife's
parental status in an effort to secure custody,45 and the husband in
Buzzanca denying his own paternity in an effort to escape liability for
child support. 6 In both cases denying the mother legal parentage
would have unsettled established custody arrangements to the
detriment of the child.47 Accordingly, the two cases might have
readily been resolved on estop~el grounds without necessarily
addressing the issue of parentage.
Nonetheless, the two courts were eager to reconcile the resolution
of the cases with the general law of custody and parentage in their
respective states, and therein lies the rub. In both cases, the parties
had established family arrangements that defied state law. In both
cases, adoption would have resolved parental status with certainty,
49
and in both cases, the children's interests required recognition of the
facts on that ground. So, the dilemma for the appellate courts was
how to protect the children without rewarding their parents'
circumvention of established law. The issue was further complicated
by the need to provide guidance for future cases.
The two cases addressed the issues in almost opposite manners.
One court, Buzzanca, squarely addressed the definition of
parenthood, and resolved the matter on the basis of what seemed to
be an ex ante determination focusing on the parties' intent at the time
of the child's conception. The other court, Doe, refused to consider
the circumstances that produced the child, instead relying on an ex
post determination of the child's needs.5" Neither ruling, however,
produced certainty in the determination of parenthood, and neither
45. Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998).
46. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282-83.
47. Doe, 710 A.2d at 1323-24; Buzzanca, 72 Cal Rptr. 2d at 294, n. 22
(observing that Luanne had custody of Jaycee since her birth).
48. Indeed, the Buzzanca court observed, "[t]here is no need in the present case
to predicate our decision on common law estoppel alone, though the doctrine
certainly applies." 72 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
49. In Doe, the surrogate was the genetic and gestational mother, and therefore
in virtually all states a legal parent. The intended parents moved to sever her
parental status on the basis of abandonment only after the divorce proceedings
began, and the final order was not issued until the child was twelve. 710 A.2d at
1300-02. In Buzzanca, the court of appeal emphasizes its astonishment at the ease
with which the trial court accepted the parties' stipulation that the gestational
mother was not a legal parent. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. See supra note 33, on the
status of Mrs. Buzzanca.
50. Indeed, the Doe court emphasized, "we are not required in this case to
decide whether, or to what extent, a surrogacy contract, by which the surrogate
obligates herself to surrender the child to the child's father and his spouse, is
enforceable. In this case, the surrogate did surrender the child, and the parental
rights of the surrogate and her husband have been terminated." 710 A.2d at 1301.
13032005]
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ruling appears to have withstood the test of time. Most critically,
neither case provides much guidance on the normative issue of
parental obligation. What is the threshold that turns functional
parents into legal parents, and can legal standards help translate legal
duty into moral obligation?
II. PARENTHOOD: FIXED FROM BIRTH-OR NOT?
A. The Marital Presumption
The dilemmas of parenthood do not begin with assisted
reproduction. Indeed, the clash between approval of the
circumstances of conception and ratification of the arrangements
needed to vindicate children's needs is an ancient one. For centuries,
the marital presumption has served to mediate these disputes. 5' The
presumption did so, however, by emphasizing marital regularity as
central to the preservation of family stability. How did the
presumption continue to uphold societal mores without sacrificing
the needs of children? The answer is that it created an ex ante
presumption that promoted family regularity while simultaneously
permitting ex post determinations where necessary to preserve the
presumption's validity. In addition, courts simply looked the other
way in the face of inconvenient facts. The crisis in parenthood today
stems from the inability to recreate this combination.
Critical to the creation (and perhaps the success) of the marital
presumption has been the impossibility, until very recently, of
determining paternity with certainty.52 In the absence of biological
51. See Lord Mansfield's Rule, articulated in Goodright v. Moss, 2 Cowp. 591,
98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (1777) (prohibiting either spouse from giving testimony in court
which cast doubt on whether the husband was the child's father).
52. Theresa Glennon observes that:
The protection of children born out of wedlock was hampered by the lack
of accurate tests to prove paternity. Until the beginning of the twentieth
century, there was no reliable scientific test available to identify the
fathers of children born out of wedlock. In 1901, blood group testing was
discovered by Dr. Karl Landsteiner at the University of Vienna. Blood
group testing identified genetic markers in the blood by analyzing specific
blood type antigens. Early types of blood group testing were often unable
to exclude a man as the biological father. By the late 1970's human
leukocyte antigen (HLA) tests had become able to both exclude and
establish the probability ofbiological paternity. Scientific research moved
ahead quickly, and by the late 1980's, DNA, or "genetic marker" testing
provided probabilities of paternity greater than 99%.
Theresa Glennon, Somebody's Child: Evaluating The Erosion Of The Marital
Presumption Of Paternity, 102 W. Va L. Rev. 547, 555-56 (2002). Courts,
however, did not begin to admit such evidence until the 1930's and the acceptability
and role of such tests remains a matter of dispute. Id. at 556-57.
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proof, the methods of securing paternal attachment have varied
enormously. Some societies placed an extraordinary premium on
female virtue as the only way to guarantee the fidelity of the male
line.53 Other societies combined fewer restrictions on women with
mechanisms for cementing parental attachment once the assumption
of child rearing responsibilities was underway.54 Within the Anglo-
American tradition, the marital presumption has occurred at the
fulcrum of a system designed to balance both concerns. In process,
the law has furthered the internalization of a set of values associated
with the interests of children."
The marital presumption starts as a presumption about biology,
but it really operates more as a presumption about the connection
between maniage and parenthood. A child born to married parents
is presumed to be their biological offspring; as a practical matter, this
means that parents' names can appear on the birth certificate and the
parents can make decisions about the child without anyone inquiring
too closely about the nature of the family relationships.56 Marriage
requires a state license and a public ceremony; parentage within
marriage requires much less. The Connecticut Does established their
parentage through a lie-the surrogate mother entered the hospital
under the name of Mrs. Doe.57 Once she was accepted as the woman
giving birth, her husband's legal status as a parent followed
automatically.5
The marital presumption has long balanced a presumption of
biology with the need to secure functional family relationships.
Although Anglo-American practice has varied, custom has almost
always placed considerable emphasis on female fidelity, and the
corresponding stigmatization of illegitimacy and adultery. 59 Without
53. See, e.g., David M. Buss, Sexual Conflict: Evolutionary Insights into
Feminism and the "Battle of the Sexes," in Sex, Power, Conflict: Evolutionary and
Feminist Perspectives at 298 (David M. Buss & Neil M. Malamuth eds., 1996). "In
a cross-cultural perspective, the ways in which men attempt to control women's
sexuality is staggering." Id.
54. Anthropologists have identified sixteen societies in South America marked
by a belief in "partible paternity," "the conviction that it is possible, even necessary,
for a child to have more than one biological father." Science and Technology:
Paternity Test, 350 The Economist 74, 75 (1999). Children in these societies fare
the best with two or three fathers; if the mothers are too promiscuous, none of the
fathers invest, but if two or three of the men mated with the mother near the time
of conception and one dies, the others contribute to the child's well-being. Id.
55. See generally Carl Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20
Hofstra L. Rev. 495 (1992) (describing the channeling role of family law).
56. See Harris, supra note 24, at 463.
57. Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297, 1302 (Conn. 1998).
58. The birth certificate is not critical in this respect to establish either of their
parental statuses.
59. Carbone, supra note 1, at 89. One of the more testable variations over
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the possibility of paternity tests, the only way to establish parentage
was through testimony about the mother's sexual relationships.6" The
very force of these norms against illegitimacy and adultery, however,
made the consequences of "bastardy" disastrous for the child.61
Lynne Kolm comments that:
In the agonizing conflict between a man's right to limit his
paternity only to his actual offspring, and the right of a child
born to a married woman to claim family membership, the
com mon law, first in England and then in America, generally
made paternal rights defer to the larger goal of preserving
family integrity. The public policy behind this presumption
is "one of the strongest known in the law., 6
2
Nevertheless, the marital presumption was never absolute. With
biological paternity as the cornerstone of assumptions about the
meaning of family ties,63 the marital presumption did not apply when
paternity was obviously impossible. Early cases held that, "If a
husband, not physically incapable, was within the four seas of
England during the period of gestation, the court would not listen to
evidence casting doubt on his paternity." The presumption did not
persist when it crossed the threshold from fiction to fantasy. For a
child, however, born to parents who were in physical proximity and
not provably impotent at the time of conception, the marital
presumption could be effectively irrebutable. Chris Altenbernd
comments:
The level of proof required to overcome this presumption was
extremely high, especially since the wife and husband were
time is the percentage of brides pregnant at the altar, reflecting in part the
acceptability of sexual relations after a betrothal. For an account of the law of
illegitimacy, see Harry D. Krause, Illegitimacy: Law and Social Policy (Bobbs-
Merrill 1971).
60. Harris, supra note 24, at 463.
61. Glennon, supra note 52, at 563. "If the marital presumption of paternity
was successfully rebutted, the results were devastating: the child was declared a
bastard, no longer entitled to support or inheritance from anyone." Id.
62. Lynne Marie Kohm, Marriage And The Intact Family: The Significance
Of Michael H. v. Gerald D., 22 Whittier L. Rev. 327, 335 (2000), citing In re the
Estate of Robertson, 520 S.2d 99 (Fla. Dist. App. 1988) (holding that the evidence
must be clear, strong and unequivocal to overcome the strong presumption that a
child born in wedlock is legitimate).
63. See, e.g., Bartlett, supra note 10, at 889. "Within the family, nature creates
the link between the social order and parental rights. Nature works on parents to
stir up their Diligence, wisely implanting in them a most tender Affection towards
these little Pictures of themselves." 2 S. Puffendorf, On The Law Of Nature And
Nations, ch. 2, § 4, at 915 (C. Oldfather & W. Oldfather trans., 1934).
64. In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 7 (1930). See also 1 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England 129 (J. Chitty ed., 1857).
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prohibited from testifying and the biological father's
testimony would have been a confession of a serious criminal
offense. . . . The common law indirectly announced and
implemented a policy that children need families, homes,
heritage, and inheritance more than biological fathers need
rights or even responsibilities.65
The key to the marital presumption thus became the evidentiary rule
that limited testimony about the opportunities for infidelity.66 After
all, unless the wife's infidelity was coupled with the husband's lack
of access, adultery did not prove non-paternity. So the courts dealt
with the weighty matter of the child's status largely by looking the
other way.67
65. Chris W. Altenbemd, Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law's
Failure in Privette and Daniel Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
219, 236(1999). SeealsoGallov. Gallo, 03-0794, 861 So. 2d 168, 174 (La. 2003).
The fundamental ends achieved by such court action were preservation of
the family unit, avoidance of the stigma of illegitimacy, and aversion to
the disinheritance that resulted from a successful disavowal action. There
is a public interest in dispelling doubts as to legitimacy which demands
the establishment of a relatively short time for bringing challenges. These
considerations contributed to this court's holding, in 1979, that the period
of time in which a husband must file a suit for disavowal to defeat the
presumption of his paternity is preemptive.
Id.
66. Glennon, supra note 52, at 564; See also County of Tioga v. South Creek,
75 Pa. 433, 437 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1874).
[M]any reasons have been given for this rule. Prominent among them is
the idea that the admission of such testimony would be unseemly and
scandalous; and this, not so much from the fact that it reveals immoral
conduct upon the part of the parents, as because of the effect it may have
upon the child, who is in no fault, but who must nevertheless be the chief
sufferer thereby. That the parents should be permitted to bastardize the
child is a proposition which shocks our sense of right and decency ....
Id.
67. Glennon, supra note 52 at 564. In Louisiana, the marital presumption was
considered conclusive. See Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 850 (La. 1989).
The presumption was so rigorously applied that in... 1972, this court
acknowledged it had never allowed a disavowal of paternity (although we
recognized two appellate court decisions had permitted disavowels in
cases where the children were born more than 300 days after judgments
of separation had been rendered). Not even Mr. Tannehill's disavowal
action succeeded, as the statutory prohibition against disavowal for natural
impotence was also found to prohibit disavowal for sterility due to
childhood disease.
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Many states hold that the marital presumption applies only so
long as is necessary to protect an intact family.68 At divorce, family
unity disappears, and many courts are therefore willing to hear
evidence about the child's paternity that they might reject in the
context of an on-going marriage. The doctrine of estoppel, however,
is then used in some jurisdictions to prevent a husband who has acted
as the father from denying paternity at divorce. The result could hold
even when husband and wife knew that the husband did not father the
child. A California court in the early sixties reacted to a husband's
effort to disavow the eleven-year-old he had helped raise since birth
with outrage. The court observed:
There is an innate immorality in the conduct of an adult who
for over a decade accepts and proclaims a child as his own,
but then, in order to be relieved of the child's support,
announces, and relies upon, his bastardy. This is a cruel
weapon, which works a lasting injury to the child and can
bring in its aftermath social harm. The weapon should garner
no profit to the wielder; the putative father should earn no
premium by the assertion of the illegitimacy of the child.69
Nonetheless, in affirming the possibility that estoppel could be used
as a basis for ordering the husband in that case to pay child support,
the court observed that the record failed to show that "the husband
68. Brinkley v. King 701 A.2d 176, 180 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
The public policy in support of the presumption of paternity is the
concern that marriages which function as family units should not be
destroyed by disputes over the parentage of children conceived or born
during the marriage. Third parties should not be allowed to attack the
integrity of a functioning marital unit, and members of that unit should not
be allowed to deny their identities as parents.
Id. Indeed, Louisiana changed its presumption from conclusive to rebuttable in
light of such considerations. See also T.D. v. M.M.M., 98-0167, 730 So. 2d 873,
878 (La. 1999).
Once the bonds of matrimony are dissolved a vinculo matrimonii, the
State's interest in preserving the marital family disappears. This does not
ignore the fact that some rights spring from the dissolution of a lawful
marriage, but recognizes instead the policy behind the codal provision and
the perspective of our times. Today's realities are that illegitimacy and
'broken homes' have neither the rarity nor the stigma as in the past. When
parenthood can be objectively determined by scientific evidence, and
where illegitimacy is no longer stigmatized, presumptions regarding
paternity are out of place.
Id. (Knoll, J., concurring).
69. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961). The
court further observed, "To be designated as an illegitimate child in pre-adolescence
is an emotional trauma of lasting consequence. Having placed the cloak of
legitimacy upon the child, having induced the child to rely upon its protection, the
husband by abruptly removing it surely harms the child." Id. at 714-15.
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represented himself to the child as his natural father" and that the boy
had relied on the representations.7° The court's sense of outrage over
the husband's disavowal of the boy's legitimacy was directed less at
the shame associated with extramarital conception than on the
father's rejection of the boy's membership in his family. What
reconciles these cases is the emphasis on the child's identity. While
the emphasis on the stigma of "bastardy" has faded, the importance
of permanence in the child's sense of self has not. The courts that
continue to use estoppel to establish paternity emphasize that:
Estoppel is based on the public policy that children should be
secure in knowing who their parents are. If a certain person
has acted as the parent and bonded with the child, the child
should not be required to suffer the potentially damaging
trauma that may come from being told that the father he has
known all his life is not in fact his father.71
B. Non-Marital Children
The treatment of non-marital children in Anglo-American law
starts with the common law doctrine offilius nullius, which literally
means that a "bastard" is the child of no one, or more accurately that
the child "is therefore of kin to nobody, and has no ancestor from
whom any inheritable blood can be derived."72 As a result, children
whose paternity involved little doubt could be denied any relationship
to their biological father.
The doctrine offilius nullius combines two premises that mirror
the marital presumption. Certainly part of the issue goes back to the
difficulty of determining paternity. The only way to be sure of
paternity in that era before DNA tests was to be sure of the mother's
virtue, and a woman giving birth without the benefit of marriage was
70. id. at 714.
71. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 795 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. 2002), cited in J.C.
v. J.S., 826 A.2d 1, 6, n. 4 (Pa. Super. 2003); Cf Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279
(Pa. Super. 2003) (where divorced husband stopped holding the child out as his
own as soon as he learned the results of the paternity tests, DNA did not apply even
though the child was eleven at the time, and the parties had been divorced since the
child was five). See also In re Marriage of Pedregon, 107 Cal. App. 4th 1284
(2003) (reaffirming application of estoppel principles in case in which husband
married mother when child was twenty-two months old, and acted as the father for
more than twelve years).
72. Blackstone, supra note 64, at 459.
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by definition untrustworthy.73 Punishment of the extramarital sin was
therefore central to the doctrine.74
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the result was in
symbolic and practical terms to deny the child membership within the
family. A child who was undeniably the child of a given mother and
father could be denied status as a member of either parent's family at
the time of Blackstone, and his father's, if not his mother's, family
thereafter. Stanley v. Illinois75 is instructive.
Peter and Joan Stanley lived together intermittently for eighteen
years and had three children without marrying. 76 When Joan died,
the children were declared "wards of the State. 77 The relevant
Illinois statute provided that, "'Parents' means the father and mother
of a legitimate child, or the survivor of them, or the natural mother
of an illegitimate child, and includes any adoptive parent., 78 The
biological father of an illegitimate child was simply not a parent
under Illinois law. As the Supreme Court explained:
... under Illinois law, Stanley is treated not as a parent but as
a stranger to his children, and the dependency proceeding has
gone forward on the presumption that he is unfit to exercise
parental rights. Insofar as we are informed, Illinois law
affords him no priority in adoption proceedings. It would be
his burden to establish not only that he would be a suitable
parent but also that he would be the most suitable of all who
might want custody of the children.79
73. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,665,92 S. Ct. 1208, 1220 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
In almost all cases, the unwed mother is readily identifiable, generally
from hospital records, and alternatively by physicians or others attending
the child's birth. Unwed fathers, as a class, are not traditionally quite so
easy to identify and locate. Many of them either deny all responsibility or
exhibit no interest in the child or its welfare; and, of course, many unwed
fathers are simply not aware of their parenthood.
Id.
74. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct 1509 (1968) (addressing
constitutionality of Louisiana statute, which barred five illegitimate children from
suing for the wrongful death of their mother). The lower courts had upheld the
statute, finding that denial of illegitimate children's right of recovery was "based
on morals and general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the
world out of wedlock." Id.
75. Stanley, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208 (majority).
76. Id. at 646, 92 S. Ct. 1210.
77. Id.
78. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 37, par. 701-14 (1967).
79. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 648, 92 S.Ct at 1211. The Court further observed that
the fact that Stanley was poor and unmarried made it unlikely he would meet such
a test even if he pursued adoption. Id.
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The State of Illinois defended the statutory presumption by arguing
that "illegitimate children" were distinguished from "legitimate
children" "not so much by their status at birth as by the factual
differences in their upbringing. While a legitimate child usually is
raised by both parents with the attendant familial relationships and a
firm concept of home and identity, the illegitimate child normally
knows only one parent-the mother."8 The refusal to recognize the
fathers of illegitimate children had therefore been decisions of
practicality-the biological father typically played no part in the
child's life and identity---even if fully identified and in the same
household he did not count; he was not a legal parent, and the child
was not (at least legally) a member of his family.
The Stanley Court declared the Illinois statute unconstitutional on
equal protection grounds, holding that the law could not
automatically treat unwed fathers differently from unwed mothers or
married men.8' While ruling that the states could not treat unwed
fathers as unfitper se, however, the Court did not further address the
issue of identity. Under what circumstances would a child be treated
as part of the family of a non-marital father? The issue remains
contentious more than thirty years after the Stanley decision.
C. Stepparents
Stepparents, that is, adults who marry a legal parent without a
biological relationship to the child, have generally had a recognized
relationship with the child during the marriage, but no continuing
80. Id. at 653, n.5, 92 S. Ct. at 1213. Justice Burger observed in his dissent
that:
When the marriage between the parents of a legitimate child is dissolved
by divorce or separation, the State, of course, normally awards custody of
the child to one parent or the other. This is considered necessary for the
child's welfare, since the parents are no longer legally bound together.
The unmarried parents of an illegitimate child are likewise not legally
bound together. Thus, even if Illinois did recognize the parenthood of
both the mother and father of an illegitimate child, it would, for
consistency with its practice in divorce proceedings, be called upon to
award custody to one or the other of them, at least once it had by some
means ascertained the identity of the father.
Id. at 666, n.4, 92 S. Ct. at 1220 (Burger, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 658-59, 92 S. Ct. at 1216-17 (majority).
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duties once the marriage ends. 2 The principal vehicle for stepparent
recognition has been the doctrine of in loco parentis.
Marriage, however, did not ordinarily confer parental status in
itself.83 Rather the status arose when "a person who has put himself
in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations
incident to the parental relationship, without going through the
formalities necessary to legal adoption, does stand in loco parentis,
and the rights, duties and liabilities of such person are the same as
those of the lawful parent." 4  The stepparents' responsibilities,
however, are not permanent. They are voluntarily assumed and may
be relinquished at will.85 Moreover, just as the assumption of in loco
parentis responsibilities can be assumed from the party's behavior,
so, too, can the termination of those responsibilities be derived from
factors such as the child's move out-of-the-house.86 Margaret
Mahoney explains that:
Most lawmakers regard the stepparent-child relationship as
derivative, that is, existing only by virtue of the marriage of
the stepparent to the natural parent. Even in cases where a
support duty existed during marriage, this model allows no
extension of the obligation after marriage termination. In the
words of one court, "[i]t is manifest, inasmuch as the liability
for support of stepchildren is a collateral one, being as it
82. Harris, supra note 24, at 466; See Hughes v. Creighton, 798 P.2d 403,
405-06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding cohabitant who believed he was natural
father was not entitled to visitation); Gayden v. Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862, 867-68
(Ct. App. 1991) (holding female cohabitant not entitled to visitation after
relationship with father ended); Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219
(Ct. App. 1991) (holding female cohabitant not entitled to visitation after
relationship with mother ended); Temple v. Meyer, 544 A.2d 629, 632 (Conn.
1988) (holding cohabitant who believed he was natural father not entitled to
visitation); In re Marriage of Freel, 448 N.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Iowa 1989) (holding
female cohabitant not entitled to visitation after relationship with father ended);
Kulla v. McNulty, 472 N.W.2d 175, 182-84 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (holding female
cohabitant not entitled to visitation after relationship with mother ended); Alison
D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29-30 (N.Y. 1991) (same); Ronald FF v. Cindy
GG, 511 N.E.2d 75, 77 (N.Y. 1987) (holding cohabitant who believed he was
probably natural father was not entitled to visitation); Cooper v. Merkel, 470
N.W.2d 253,255-56 (S.D. 1991) (holding male cohabitant not entitled to visitation
after relationship with mother ended); In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 209-13 (Wis.
1991) (holding female cohabitant not entitled to visitation after relationship with
mother ended).
83. See, e.g., Trudell v. Leatherby, 212 Cal. 678, 681 (Cal. 1931).
84. Loomis v. State, 39 Cal. Rptr. 820, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
85. Margaret M. Mahoney, Support And Custody Aspects Of The Stepparent-
Child Relationship, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 38, 42 (1984).
86. Id. In addition, promises of support are not necessarily binding. See, e.g.,
Sargeant v. Sargeant, 495 P.2d 618, 623 (Nev. 1972) (promises made by husband
during marital separation held not binding at time of divorce).
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were, an offshoot of the marriage itself, that once the
marriage ends or is declared non-existent, the collateral
liability to support stepchildren also ends."87
Underlying this doctrine is the conclusion that, absent adoption,
the stepparent is not a "real" parent, that is, the stepparent does not
have a permanent bond with the child constitutive of identity. This
conclusion has two components. First, as Mahoney emphasizes, the
obligation to the child is seen as derivative of the obligation to the
legal parent. When the adult relationship ends, so does the obligation
to the child. While the biological parent has a unique and permanent
obligation to the child by virtue of his role in the child's conception,"
the stepparent does not.8 9
The second factor is the desire to encourage remarriage. Parents
with children from a prior relationship are often viewed as less
desirable on the "marriage market." 9 If marriage to a legal parent
triggered permanent support obligations to the child, it would further
discourage the enterprise. Indeed, commentators have raised this
concern to oppose even those obligations tied to in loco parentis.9
Visitation rights, unlike financial obligations, do not discourage
marriage. But while legal parents can certainly agree to allow
stepparent visitation following divorce, they are unlikely to be
compelled to do so.92 Although a few states, including California and
Louisiana, have extended visitation rights to stepparents, 93 after
87. Mahoney, supra note 85, at 52-53 (citing Cynthia M. v. Elton M.,
N.Y.S.2d 934, 935 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1972) (denying mother's petition for child
support from former husband)).
88. Id. at 40.
89. Mahoney notes that it is the parent's reliance on the stepparent's support,
rather than the child's, that provides the more compelling basis for post-divorce
support. Id. at 56, 59.
90. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the
Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 Win. & Mary Bill of
Rts. J. 1011, 1033 (2003).
91. Mahoney, supra note 85, at 45-46.
92. Id. at 62.
93. See La. Civ. Code art. 136:
B. Under extraordinary circumstances, a relative, by blood or affinity, or
a former stepparent or step grandparent, not granted custody of the child
may be granted reasonable visitation rights if the court finds that it is in
the best interest of the child. In determining the best interest of the child,
the court shall consider:
(1) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child
and the relative.
(2) Whether the child is in need of guidance, enlightenment, or
tutelage which can best be provided by the relative.
(3) The preference of the child if he is determined to be of sufficient
maturity to express a preference.
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Troxel,94 stepparents must overcome the more strongly enforced
presumptions in favor of the legal parents.95 Moreover, visitation by
itself, even when available as a matter of right, is not the same thing
as parental status. It is ordinarily secondary to the parent's
continuing custodial rights, and there is not, as there is with parental
status, a necessary moral obligation to exercise it.96
III. PARENTHOOD: RENEGOTIATED IN LIGHT OF SUBSEQUENT
EVENTS?
A. Erosion of the Marital Presumption 's Utility and Moral Force
The combination of factors that made the marital presumption so
effective has not endured. Certainly, the most dramatic change has
been the advent of paternity tests. While neither the child's physical
appearance nor testimony of non-access may conclusively prove or
disprove paternity,97 Glennon estimates the accuracy of DNA tests by
the late eighties as greater than ninety-nine percent.9" Courts could
bar all evidence of infidelity, and still determine paternity with
certainty. Indeed, even courts upholding the marital presumption
(4) The willingness of the relative to encourage a close relationship
between the child and his parent or parents.
(5) The mental and physical health of the child and the relative.
See also Cal. Civ. Code §§ 4351.5(a), (I) (1983):
[I]n the proceedings under [the code sections dealing with annulment,
marriage dissolution and separation proceedings], the . . . court has
jurisdiction to award reasonable visitation rights to a person who is a party
to the marriage that is the subject of the proceeding with respect to a
minor child of the other party to the marriage, if visitation by that person
is determined to be in the best interests of the minor child . . . Any
visitation right granted to a stepparent pursuant to this section shall not
conflict with any visitation or custodial right of a natural or adoptive
parent who is not a party to the proceeding.
94. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000).
95. See In re Marriage ofW., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d461 (Cal Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that application of a broadly worded visitation statute that permitted the court to
order stepparent visitation without "a presumption that a parent's decision regarding
visitation is in the best interest of the child" violated the parent's constitutional
fights articulated in Troxeo.
96. David Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, And The Law's
Perceptions Of "Family" After Divorce in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads,
104-08, 118-19 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., Yale University
Press 1990) (conflicting expectations and difficulty of stepparent role).
97. Of course, in earlier eras, a notable exception involved interracial children
to whom the marital presumption might not apply. Glennon, supra note 52, at 565,
n.142.
98. Id. at 556.
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cannot-and may not wish to--prevent the children from ultimately
discovering the truth.
The grounds on which continued adherence to the marital
presumption reached the Supreme Court, however, involved less the
certainty of paternity tests than the continued moral force underlying
the presumption. Michael H. v. Gerald D.99 involved the
circumstances in which the marital presumption may have the
greatest continuing utility-viz., the ability of an intact family to
manage its affairs free from the interference of an outsider, even an
outsider whose biological paternity is not in doubt.' ° Justice Scalia,
writing the plurality opinion, observed that:
[T]he legal issue in the present case reduces to whether
the relationship between persons in the situation of Michael
and Victoria has been treated as a protected family unit under
the historic practices of our society, or whether on any other
basis it has been accorded special protection. We think it
impossible to find that it has. In fact, quite to the contrary,
our traditions have protected the marital family (Gerald,
Carole, and the child they acknowledge to be theirs) against
the sort of claim Michael asserts.'
The dissent, in contrast, questioned the continued vitality of the
forces that produced the marital presumption. Justice Brennan, for
example, referred to the challenged statute "stubbornly" insisting on
labeling Gerald the father "in the face of evidence showing a 98
percent probability that her father is Michael."' 2 He commented: In
the plurality's constitutional universe, we may not take notice of the
fact that the original reasons for the conclusive presumption of
paternity are out of place in a world in which blood tests can prove
virtually beyond a shadow of a doubt who sired a particular child and
99. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
100. Naomi Cahn and I have observed, however, that the facts of the case look
very different if considered at the point when the case was first brought rather than
five years later when the Supreme Court issued its decision. Michael initially
asserted his parental rights shortly after the relationship with Carole ended.
Victoria was three at the time, Michael had been living with her and her mother,
and everyone involved (most critically Victoria) treated Michael as the father. In
contrast, by the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision in 1989, Victoria was
living with Gerald and Carole in New York, two new children had been born into
the marriage, and the California court's refusal in 1984 to recognize the man she
regarded as her "daddy" had effectively ended her relationship with him. June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1011,
1045 (2003).
101. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
102. Id. at 148, 109 S. Ct. at 2355 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in which the fact of illegitimacy no longer plays the burdensome and
stigmatizing role it once did. l03
The facts of the case underscore Justice Brennan's point. Justice
Scalia began the opinion, noting that the "facts of this case are, we
must hope, extraordinary."' 0 4 Carole, an international model, and
Gerald, a top executive in a French oil company, were married and
lived in Playa del Rey, California "when one or the other was not out
of the country on business."' '°  Carole became involved in an
"adulterous affair" with a neighbor, Michael H., and conceived a
,chil, Vcftoria, though Gerald was listed as the father on the birth
certificate. 6 When Gerald moved to New York City to pursue
business interests, Victoria stayed with Carole in California, visited
Michael in St. Thomas, returned to California with her mother and
lived with "yet another man, Scott K."'0 7 Carole and Victoria spent
time with Gerald in New York City, returned to Scott in California,
spent more time with Gerald in New York, reconciled with Michael
and lived with him for eight months in California. 1' 8 Around the time
Victoria turned three, however, Carole permanently parted ways with
Michael, and resumed the marriage with Gerald in New York, where
they subsequently had two additional children.'0 9 The idea that
Gerald's legal status as a parent might turn on the stigma associated
with adultery or illegitimacy was, by the time the case reached the
Supreme Court in 1989, anachronistic to say the least.
The Supreme Court has not revisited the issue since, and the
states courts, not unlike the Supreme Court itself, have fractured over
the issue."0 In Callender v. Skiles,"' the Iowa Supreme Court
echoed Justice Brennan's reasoning to maintain that:
The traditional ways to establish legal parentage have
dramatically changed in recent generations, as has the
traditional makeup of the family. Scientific advancements
103. Id. at 140, 109 S. Ct. at 2351.
104. Id. at 113, 109 S. Ct. at 2337 (majority).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 114.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The opinion in Michael H. could not command a majority of the court.
Only Justice Rehnquist entirely joined Justice Scalia's plurality opinion. Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedy joined. Justice
Stevens concurred in the judgment, and four justices dissented. Id. at 112, 109 S.
Ct. 2336. Justice Stevens' concurrence in the judgment, which provided the fifth
vote for the judgment against Michael, was based on a reading of California law
with which none of the other justices agreed. Id. at 136, 109 S. Ct. at 2348-49
(Stevens, J., concurring).
111. Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1999).
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have opened a host of complex family-related legal issues
which have changed the legal definition of a parent. It has
also made the identity of a biological parent a virtual
certainty. Social stigmas have also weakened. If we
recognize parenting rights to be fundamental under one set of
circumstances, those rights should not necessarily disappear
simply because they arise in another set of circumstances
involving consenting adults that have not traditionally been
embraced. Instead, we need to focus on the underlying right
at stake."
2
The right at stake to which the Iowa court referred was the biological
father's ability to establish the fact of paternity, and to a relationship
with his child. On remand, the lower courts terminated the husband's
parental status and ordered visitation for the "new" father. 1
3
Over twenty states permit putative fathers to establish paternity
even over the objections of the mother and her husband."' Some,
like Iowa, recognize the ability to do so as a right granted by the state
constitution.' 5 Others, which continue to give greater force to the
marital presumption, now permit easier circumvention." 6 What these
states fail to answer coherently, however, is what has happened to the
moral force of parenthood? When are parental rights accompanied
by a duty to exercise them? The answer is that the marital
presumption has not been replaced by any overarching definition of
parenthood. Instead, the idea of parenthood has been divided into
component parts that play out differently in different contexts,
amplifying the legal, if not biological, uncertainties that today
underlie the definition of parenthood.
112. Id. at 190.
113. Callender v. Skiles, 623 N.W.2d 852, 857 (Iowa 2001). See also Serafm
v. Serafm, N.W.2d 461, 462 (1977) (abolishing the long-standing rule that
prevented husband or wife from rebutting husband's paternity).
114. Id. at 189. For more recent developments, see Niccol Kording, Nature v.
Nurture: Children Left Fatherless and Family-Less When Nature Prevails In
Paternity Actions, 65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 811 (2004).
115. See R. MeG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666, 672 (Colo. 1980) (equal protection
provision of Colorado Constitution mandated putative father be given standing to
establish paternity while mother is married); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 198
(Tex. 1994) (statute denying putative father standing to challenge paternity violated
due process clause of state constitution), superseded by statute Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 160.101(a)(3) (1996) (permits biological father to contest another man's
status as presumed father). See also Brian C. v. Ginger K., 77 Cal. App. 4th 1198,
92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294 (Cal. App. 4th 2000).
116. Jaqulyn A. West, Comment, Maintaining the Legal Fiction: Application
of the Presumption ofPaternity and Paternity by Estoppel in Pennsylvania, 42 Duq.
L. Rev. 577 (2004).
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B. Estoppel: What Remains of Reliance?
As the Clevenger case indicates, estoppel served as the moral
backstop of the marital presumption." 7  Even when the fact of
biological non-paternity could not be denied, the courts could still
lock in a husband who had functioned as a child's father on the basis
of estoppel. Decided in 1961, the case reflected a greater willingness
to recognize uncomfortable biological facts, but it still reflected
moral judgment: a man who knowingly embraced the paternal role
could not so easily set it aside."8
While many states continue to observe estoppel principles, they
do not have the force of a virtually irrebutable marital presumption.
Alaska illustrates what has become the modem trend. Earlier
Alaskan cases found that paternity by estoppel was "intended to
avoid unfairness and emotional harm to the child from frustrating the
child's expectation of care and support to adulthood... ." ' In the
1999 case of B.E.B. v. R.L.B., 2 ° the trial court relied on those cases
to establish paternity in a case where a husband, who had undergone
a vasectomy procedure, nonetheless acted as the father of a child bom
into the marriage for the first five years of the boy's life. 12' The
Alaska Supreme Court reversed, and in doing so, rejected the
Clevenger definition of estoppel altogether. 22 The court observed
that the states observed two lines of doctrine in parenthood by
estoppel cases. The first followed Clevenger in permitting a showing
of prejudice based on emotional harm."' The second, which the
117. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
118. Id. The court reasoned:
The relationship of father and child is too sacred to be thrown off like an
old cloak, used and unwanted. We are dealing with the care and education
of a child during his minority and with the obligation of the party who has
assumed as a father to discharge it. The law is not so insensitive as to
countenance the breach of an obligation in so vital and deep a relation,
undertaken, partially fulfilled, and suddenly sundered.
Id. at 716.
119. Wright v. Black, 856 P.2d 477 (Alaska 1993).
120. B.E.B. v. R.L.B, 979 P.2d 514 (Ak. 1999).
121. The trial court found that the boy "would suffer emotional damage if
B.E.B. were allowed to abandon the paternal role that he had voluntarily established
with the boy." To protect the boy from this emotional harm, the court estopped the
husband from denying paternity and ordered him to continue paying support. Id.
at 515-16.
122. Id. at 518-20.
123. The court cited Clevenger for the proposition that, in a case involving
paternity by estoppel, the traditional requirement of prejudice can be met in one of
three ways:
(1) the child is deprived of the mother's potential action to hold the natural
father responsible for the support of the child; (2) the child gives his love
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Alaska court described as the majority rule,124 limited the showing of
prejudge to financial harm. 25
This second line of cases reasons that emotional bonding alone is
not enough to invoke estoppel because:
to hold otherwise would create enormous
policy difficulties. A stepparent who tried to create a warm
family atmosphere with his or her stepchildren would be
penalized by being forced to pay support for them in the
event of a divorce. At the same time, a stepparent who
refused to have anything to do with his or her stepchildren
beyond supporting them would be rewarded by not having to
pay support in the event of a divorce. 26
The Alaska court despaired at the prospect of persuading a non-
biological father to protect the child's emotional well-being. It
concluded that an "order requiring the father to pay support or
barring him from challenging paternity will hardly prevent him from
publicly claiming that he is not actually the child's father.' ' 27 Indeed,
the court thought that an order to pay support "might itself destroy an
otherwise healthy paternal bond by driving a destructive wedge of
bitterness and resentment between the father and his child.'1 8 In
short, in an era of frequently changing relationships, the court did not
think that either the established bond with a young child or the
promises of matrimony were enough to forge a permanent basis for
non-biological parenthood.
This sense of impermanence affects even those states that
continue to combine the marital presumption with estoppel on the
and affection to the husband, expecting care and support until adulthood.
Denying paternity later inflicts an emotional injury on the child; (3) the
child, who has held himself out as legitimate, suffers a social injury when
that status is removed.
Id. at 516 (citing Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961)).
124. Id. at 514.
125. Part of the explanation the court gave for its reversal of Alaskan doctrine
was that "the parties in Wright do not seem to have alerted us to the large body of
cases that are at odds with Clevenger, since the applicable estoppel standard was
evidently uncontested. We thus appear to have accepted Clevenger as a
conventional description of a uniformly accepted doctrine." Id. at 519.
126. Id. at 518 (citing Knill v. Knill, 510 A.2d 546 (Md. 1986); Miller v. Miller,
478 A.2d 351, 359 (N.J. 1984)). See also K.A.T. v. C.A.B., 645 A.2d 570, 573
(D.C. 1994); Wiese v. Wiese, 699 P.2d 700, 702 (Utah 1985); Quintela v. Quintela,
544 N.W.2d 111, 117-19 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996); K.B. v. D.B., 639 N.E.2d 725,
728-29 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
127. B.E.B. v. R.L.B, 979 P.2d 514 (Ak. 1999).
128. Id.
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basis of emotional ties.129 Consider, for example, the case of Doran
v. Doran in Pennsylvania. 130 The child, William, Jr., was born in
1990. Just before the child's fifth birthday, the Dorans divorced and
Mr. Doran agreed to pay child support. About a year after the
divorce, Mr. Doran discovered that his wife had had an affair during
the marriage, an affair he later learned had started before the child's
birth and lasted more than a decade afterwards. He asked the mother
whether the child was his. She said "yes," and he continued to accept
the child as his own. In 2001, however, when the child was eleven,
Mr. Doran became increasingly convinced that the child did not
resemble him, and persuaded the mother to permit DNA testing.'
The tests indicated that the "probability of paternity was zero
percent!" 32 Mr. Doran suggested that they jointly tell the child, but
the mother went ahead and told the child on her own. Mr. Doran then
"gently as possible removed himself from the child's life in a way
which he felt would cause the child the least amount of anguish and
hurt," 33 and moved to terminate child support.
The court first concluded that the marital presumption did not
apply because "there is no longer an intact family or a marriage to
preserve."'' 34  The court then considered the issue of estoppel
explaining that:
Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal determination
that because of a person's conduct (e.g., holding out the child
as his own, or supporting the child) that person, regardless of
his true biological status, will not be permitted to deny
parentage, nor will the child's mother who has participated in
this conduct be permitted to sue a third party for support,
claiming that the third party is the true father.'
Mr. Doran had clearly acted as the father from birth, exercised
visitation and paid support after the divorce, and continued to see the
129. See Barnard v. Anderson, 767 A.2d 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). The
husband had a vasectomy after three children were born into the marriage. Three
years later, his wife became pregnant, and they separated five months after the baby
was born. The Superior Court held that the marital presumption ofpaternity did not
apply because "the very purpose for application of the presumption, preservation
of the marriage, has been thwarted and is no longer relevant, for the parties were
divorced before the hearing of this matter." Id. at 595.
130. Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
131. Id. at 1281 (citing Fish v. Behers, 741 A. 2d. 721,723 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1999)).
132. Doran, 820 A.2d at 1281.
133. Id.




child after he learned the result of the DNA tests.'36 Nonetheless, he
argued that he had been deceived by the mother's conduct. The trial
court agreed, finding that Mr. Doran would not have held the child
out as his own had he known the truth, and therefore, could not be
estopped from denying paternity.'37
The marital presumption, where it applies, locks in parentage on
the basis of the facts at the time of the child's birth. Estoppel, in
contrast, looks at adult behavior after the child is born. In the Doran
case, Mr. Doran's ability to deny parentage turned on two factors: the
spouses' behavior toward each other, with particular emphasis on the
mother's deceit, and the speed of Mr. Doran's disavowal of
parenthood after he learned the truth of paternity. If Mr. Doran had
done what he arguably might have regarded as "the right thing" and
either shielded the child from knowledge of his origins or reaffirmed
his paternal role without the biological connection, he would have
continued to be liable for support."' Indeed, some commentators
have concluded that, under Pennsylvania law, "unless the putative
father ceases contact with the child upon learning that he is not the
biological father, he will be forced to support that child"'39 -with,
of course, the funds paid to the custodial parent who deceived him.
The earlier estoppel cases like Clevenger4 ° emphasized the
child's need for certainty and moral judgment of the husband's desire
to escape responsibility. The modem cases, if they lock in paternity
at all, seem resigned to the effective end of the relationship. The
moral judgment then shifts to a determination of whether the
mother's behavior excuses her husband, or whether the biological
father's potential presence makes support unnecessary.'' Either
way, the focus becomes the continuation of support rather than the
child's family membership.
C. Unmarried Fathers: Parentage and Lies
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1284-85.
138. See, e.g., J.C. v. J.S., 826 A.2d l(Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (applying estoppel
where ex-husband continued to act as the father for several years after his ex-wife
informed him that he was not the father of the child).
139. West, supra note 116, at 583.
140. Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 714 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961).
141. See, e.g., Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995). In this
case, the mother told her husband that an "unknown man" had fathered the child.
When the father learned the identity of the biological father years later, and found
that it was someone who lived nearby, he separated from the mother and stopped
contact with the child, who then established a relationship with the biological
father. The Pennsylvania Superior Court refused to apply estoppel in a suit for
child support against the biological father. Id. at 576.
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The Stanley line of cases initiated greater recognition of the
parental status of unmarried men without, however, guaranteeing
certainty about their identity or the extent of their authority over the
child. Although many states now confer parental status on the basis
of biology alone, 14 2 the extension of parental rights to two people who
do not necessarily have a relationship created problems of its own.'14 3
As a result what appears to be an ex ante system based on biology is
in fact a far more fragile and insecure system of parental opportunity.
For unmarried fathers before Stanley, the law corresponded with
widely held notions of moral obligation-marry the mother or forfeit
the right to play a role in the child's life.'" Fathers of all kinds are
now encouraged to craft a commitment to the child independent of
their relationship with the mother. For unmarried partners, the
mother's pregnancy triggers a dilemma-under what circumstances
should the father be identified and how should his role in the child's
life be secured?
The most dramatic cases involve men who have objected to the
mother's decision to place the child for adoption. Indeed, the three
Supreme Court cases immediately following Stanley all involved
mothers' efforts to terminate the parental rights of biological fathers
in order to facilitate a stepparent adoption by the mother's new
husband.145 The Supreme Court affirmed the constitutional
protection accorded the father's parental standing on the basis of
what has been called "biology-plus," that is, biological paternity plus
an established relationship with the child. The fathers who lived with
mother and child after the child's birth and established a parental
bond received constitutional protection; the fathers who had no such
ties were accorded no protection even when the mother had frustrated
their efforts to bond with the infant. 146
142. Harris, supra note 24, at 468.
143. Carbone, supra note 1, at 186-94.
144. Compare The Honorable John E. Fennelly, Step Up or Step Out: Unwed
Fathers' Paternal Rights Post-Doe and E.A. W, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 259 (1996)
(contending that unwed fathers should exercise parental rights or allow someone
else to do so).
145. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258-61, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983);
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979); Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 247-48, 98 S. Ct 549 (1978).
146. Stanley and Caban had established such relationships with the children and
prevailed before the Supreme Court; Lehr and Quillion did not. For a fuller account
of these cases, see Carbone, supra note 1, at 166-70. These cases differ from
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989), in that no marital
relationship was involved. For a discussion of the cases extending this recognition
of a constitutional right even to those fathers who conducted an adulterous affair,
see Brian C. v. Ginger K., 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 294, (Cal. App. 4th 2000), and
Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182 (Iowa 1999).
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As Leslie Harris observes, however, "under the statutes and case
law of many states, custodial claims of unwed fathers are protected
to a far greater extent than the Supreme Court has said is
constitutionally necessary, even when this protection comes at the
price of disrupting functional, but not biologically related,
families."'47 Perhaps the most controversial recognition of unmarried
biological fathers' rights has come in the cases in which the fathers
have sought to undo adoptions arranged by the mother. The most
infamous of the cases resulted in the transfer of four-year-old Baby
Richard and two-and-a-half year old Baby Jessica from their adoptive
parents to biological parents they did not know.'48
The trajectory of these cases, at least to the extent the decisions
focus on fairness between the parents rather than fairness to the child,
parallels the decisional bases of the estoppel cases. In eras of
biological uncertainty, the one certain parent, the mother, was
entrusted with decision-making power. Today, in many jurisdictions,
identification of the biological father confers equal decision-making
powers, and the mother cannot place the child for adoption, thereby
terminating the biological father's parental status, without his
consent.'49 In the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica cases, the mothers
did not identify the biological father and frustrated his attempts to
become involved with the child. Once the respective courts ruled that
the adoption had not successfully terminated his parental rights
because of the mother's deceit, the father was entitled to custody, and
the would-be adoptive parents who had raised the children from birth
were legal strangers to the child no different from other third
parties."' The child's fate, as in the estoppel cases, turned on the
legal status of parenthood, and determination of that status depended
on validating biology in the face of parental deceit.'5 '
147. Harris, supra note 24, at 468.
148. See In Interest of B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992); In re Petition of
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (111. 1995), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599 (1995).
149. Carbone, supra, note 1, at 170. Many states require the consent of both
parents for adoption unless one of the parents cannot be found, has abandoned the
child, or is otherwise shown to be unfit. Id.
150. For more extended accounts of these cases, see Harris, supra note 24, at
468-73, and Carbone, supra note 1, at 170. See also Barbara B. Woodhouse,
Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 Cardozo
L. Rev. 1747 (1993); Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as FamilyArbiter: A Moral
in the Mess? 102 Colum. L. Rev. 337 (2002); Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene:
Judicial Assumptions about Parenthood, 40 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 637 (1993);
Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children "and Their Parents Before the United States
Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 28 Cap. U.L. Rev. 1 (1999).
151. The Illinois Supreme Court observed in the case of Baby Richard that:
The adoption laws of Illinois are neither complex nor difficult of
application. Those laws intentionally place the burden of proof on the
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To remedy the harm caused by the long delays in the adoption
cases, many states have attempted to lock in the determination of
parental status as soon as possible after birth. Some states have very
short periods for the exercise of parental rights. 5 2 Others require the
father to demonstrate his commitment to mother and child during the
pregnancy.'53 Many protect adoption petitions from collateral attack
even in the case of deceit, but the typical period for finality for that
legislation is one year.'54 These measures, however, have produced
no uniformity in state approaches to paternity. Instead, they confer
on biological parents the right to establish a relationship with the
child; both the fact and legal status of parenthood may depend on
whether the father succeeds in doing so. 
55
adoptive parents in establishing both the relinquishment and/or unfitness
of the natural parents and, coincidentally, the fitness and the right to adopt
of the adoptive parents. In addition, Illinois law requires a good-faith
effort to notify the natural parents of the adoption proceedings. These
laws are designed to protect natural parents in their preemptive rights to
their own children wholly apart from any consideration of the so-called
best interests of the child. If it were otherwise, few parents would be
secure in the custody of their own children. If best interests of the child
were a sufficient qualification to determine child custody, anyone with
superior income, intelligence, education, etc., might challenge and deprive
the parents of their right to their own children. The law is otherwise and
was not complied with in this case.
In re Petition ofDoe I, rev 'd, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-83 (Ill. 1994), rehearing denied,
638 N.E.2d at 187 (Ill. 1994).
152. Nebraska, for example, requires filing a notice of intent to claim paternity
within five days of the child's birth. Carbone, supra n. 1, at 171. See also Deborah
L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 967, 1000-03 (1994);
Alison S. Pally, Father by Newspaper Ad: The Impact of In Re the Adoption of a
Minor Childon the Definition ofFatherhood, 13 Colum. J. Gender & L. 169 (2004)
(providing an account of Florida legislation providing notice by newspaper ad to
biological fathers).
153. See Matter of Raquel Marie X, 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990), appeal
following remand, 570 N.Y.S.2d 604 (A.D. 1991); C. V. v. J. M. J., 810 So. 2d 692(Ala. App. 1999); Matter ofAdoption ofDoe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989); Adoption
of Michael H., 898 P.2d 891 (Cal. 1995) (en banc).
154. See, e.g., In re adoption of S.L.F., 27 P.3d 583 (Utah App. 2001).
155. Jeffrey Pamess concludes that:
Failures of unwed biological fathers to meet statutory paternity norms also
can result from poor legislative drafting where the necessary steps to
parenthood remain unclear. For example, one law that simply says an
unwed biological father must avoid "neglect of, or misconduct toward the
child" in order to participate in any later adoption proceeding. Other laws
say that to participate, unwed fathers must provide "reasonable and
consistent payments" amounting to "tangible means of support" or make
"reasonable efforts" toward "parental commitment" although "thwarted"
by the mother or her agents. Here, the statutory requirements are so vague
that they promote unfettered judicial discretion. They invite courts to
consider irrelevant (in the evidentiary sense) circumstances such as the
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Fatherhood, of course, also depends on identification of the
biological parent and while there is little pressure for uniformity in
state custody decisions, the federal government has exercised
considerably more interest in child support. To that end, uniform
statutes and federal legislation have attempted to facilitate
identification of the biological parent at birth. 5 Birth certificates
were intended to perform that function, but such certificates were
frequently incomplete, especially for the unmarried. '57 Moreover, the
mere fact of a man's name on the birth certificate did not necessarily
mean that either he is the genetic father or that he had consented to
the appearance of his name. 5 8 A new process, involving voluntary
acknowledgments of parenthood, has been developed to remedy these
limitations. The Uniform Parentage Act of 2000, drafted to
implement the federal legislation requiring that the states adopt
hospital-based programs to encourage paternity identification,
provided, "The mother of a child and a man claiming to be the father
of the child conceived as the result of sexual intercourse with the
mother may sign an acknowledgment of paternity with intent to
establish the man's paternity."' 5  The 2002 version of the Act
changed the term "conceived as the result of sexual intercourse" to
refer instead to "a man claiming to be the genetic father of the
child.' 160 The drafters explained:
PRWORA does not explicitly require that a man
acknowledging parentage necessarily is asserting his genetic
parentage of the child. In order to prevent circumvention of
adoption laws, § 301 corrects this omission by requiring a
sworn assertion of genetic parentage of the child. A 2002
amendment provides that a man who signs an
acknowledgment of paternity declares that he is the genetic
bonding between the child and the prospective adopting couple or the
comparative fitness of the biological father and the prospective adopting
couple.
Jeffrey A. Parness, Participation of Unwed Biological Fathers in Newborn
Adoptions: AchievingSubstantiveandProceduralFairness, 5 J. L. Fam. Stud. 223,
229-30 (2003).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C) (1998) (providing that a state must have a
simple civil process for parents to voluntarily to acknowledge paternity, which must
include a hospital-based program "focusing on the period immediately before or
after the birth of a child.").
157. Jeffrey A. Parness, Federalizing Birth Certificate Procedures, 42 Brandeis
L.J. 105 (2003); Jeffrey A. Pamess, Designating Male Parents at Birth, 26 U. Mich.
J.L. Ref. 573, 576-78 (1993).
158. Jeffrey A. Pamess, Designating Male Parents At Birth, 26 U. Mich. J.L.
Ref. 573, 577 (1993).
159. Uniform Parentage Act of 2000 § 301.
160. Uniform Parentage Act of 2002 § 301.
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father of the child. Thus both the man and the mother
acknowledge his paternity, under penalty of peijury, without
requiring the parents to spell out the details of their sexual
relations. Further, the amended language also takes into
account a situation in which a man, who is unable to have
sexual intercourse with his partner, may still have contributed
to the conception of the child through the use of his own
sperm. 161
The Act gives the parties sixty days to file for rescission, but is
otherwise conclusive. 62  Even in the case of fraud, the Act
establishes a two-year time limit for contesting parental status. 63
The Act is intended to establish a streamlined system for
establishing paternity."6 As with the marital presumption, no court
proceeding or paternity tests are necessary; it is enough for the
woman giving birth and the man acknowledging paternity to sign and
file the statement.'65 The system, however, has not succeeded in
preventing challenges based either on the use of such declarations to
circumvent adoption or to include the desired father without certainty
about his biological status. Consider the case of the County of Los
Angeles v. Sheldon p. 6 6 The child, J., was born in July 1997, and in
accordance with the California statute, the mother was encouraged to
sign a voluntary acknowledgment before she left the hospital. 1"' The
biological father (Sheldon) had refused to give the mother financial
help and the mother wanted to make sure that someone would have
legal authority over the child if anything happened to her.'68
Accordingly, she asked a friend, Leon, whom she knew could not be
the biological father, to sign the declaration. 69 Sheldon, however,
later reconciled with the mother and lived with and supported mother
and child for several years) 70 When Sheldon moved out, the mother
sought assistance from the county. In seeking child support from the
161. Id. cmt. to § 301.
162. Id. § 307.
163. Id. § 308.
164. See, e.g., County Of Los Angeles v. Sheldon P., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 352
(Cal. App. 2002) (noting with respect to a similar statute that "[t]he Legislature
further found that a simple system for voluntary paternity declarations would result
in a significant increase in the ease of establishing paternity and a significant
decrease in the time and money needed to establish paternity, and was in the public
interest.").
165. Uniform Parentage Act of 2002 § 302.
166. County of Los Angeles v. Sheldon P., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350 (Cal. App.
2002).






biological father, the county moved to set aside the voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity."'7 The appellate court concluded that
there was ample factual record to set aside the acknowledgment, as
the mother asked Leon to sign the declaration while under pain
medication, was not advised that she could leave the hospital without
providing information about the child's father, and was not given the
proper explanatory materials as required by Cal. Fam. Code §
7572. 172
This case demonstrates the difficulty of securing any
determination of paternity. So long as the parties were in agreement,
no one inquired too closely into their affairs. Sheldon, the biological
father, was aware of the pregnancy, but did not inquire into the
presence of Leon's name on the declaration. Had he not reunited
with the mother, Leon would have remained J.'s legal father even if
Leon had never developed a relationship with her. In the meantime,
the county action was not initiated until after J. turned three, and the
effort to establish a formal record of Sheldon's paternity occurred
only because the county wished to establish responsibility for child
support. 173
The appellate action turned on the hospital's failure to follow the
right procedures in securing the declaration, but imagine the
consequences of a better-informed hospital staff. If the staff had
correctly explained the law to J. 's mother, documented its procedures
in writing, and secured her signature during a period in which she
was not on medication, should the outcome really have been
different? Sheldon was both J.'s biological father and the only man
to perform the role. Leon was a friend of the mother's, volunteering
without any apparent intention to bond with the child. While other
cases have found voluntary acknowledgments to be conclusive,
174
there is no guarantee that the results will correspond with assumption
of a paternal role.
Voluntary acknowledgments of paternity are intended to function
much like the marital presumption.7 5 They create a hard to rebut
171. Id.at340-41.
172. Id. at 347-48.
173. Id. at340-41.
174. See, e.g., People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Smith, 818 N.E.2d
1204 (Ill. 2004) (supporting that a father's acknowledgment of paternity is
conclusive under state law). In Smith, two days after the child was born, Smith
executed a voluntary acknowledgment of paternity. Subsequently, Smith learned
through DNA testing that the child was not his biological child. Id. Smith then
brought an action to declare the nonexistence of the parent-child relationship. The
court concluded that under the Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/6(d) (West
2002)), a signed acknowledgment of paternity may be challenged in court only on
the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. Id.
175. Id. at 397.
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presumption of paternity with a minimum of judicial intervention.
And like the marital presumption, they require the cooperation of
both parents. When, however, these voluntary declarations prove to
be a fiction, or when they do not withstand the test of time, it is not
clear that they serve the child's interest in acquiring a permanent
identity. Indeed, at a time when the marital presumption is
increasingly viewed as an anachronism, the more limited
commitment of a voluntary acknowledgment may prove harder to
dislodge.
D. Stepparents Revisited.- Legal Recognition Now, Later or
Forever?
The common law drew clear distinctions between biological
parents and stepparents, who attained their legal status only through
their marriage to an adult with parental status."' A number of states,
however, now extend the concept of in loco parentis, or open ended
custody statutes, to provide a basis for stepparent visitation. John
Gregory observes that one of the first recognitions of stepparents'
custodial rights occurred in Pennsylvania in 1980.17 In Spells v.
Spells, the court observed:
It is our belief that a stepparent may not be denied the right
to visit his stepchildren merely because of his lack of a blood
relationship to them. Clearly, a stepparent and his young
stepchildren who live in a family environment may develop
deep and lasting mutual bonds of affection. Courts must
acknowledge the fact that a stepfather (or stepmother) may be
the only parent that the child has truly known and loved
during its minority. A stepparent may be as devoted and
concerned about the welfare of a stepchild as a natural parent
would be. Rejection of visitation privileges cannot be
grounded in the mere status as a stepparent.
176. For an overview of these issues, see Mary Ann Mason and Nicole Zayac,
Rethinking Stepparent Rights: Has The ALI Found A Better Definition?, 36 Fam.
L. Q. 227, 229 (2002).
177. It is hardly, however, the first recognition of the custodial rights of a
stepparent. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Kraus v. Kraus, 138 A.2d 225 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1958).
178. John DeWitt Gregory, Defining the Family in the Millennium: The Troxel
Follies, 32 U. Mem. L. Rev. 687, 691-92 (2002), citing Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d
873, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977). In granting stepparent visitation, the court based




Wisconsin has extended the doctrine of in loco parentis beyond
stepparents married to a legal parent to anyone who assumes the
parental role. In 1995, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held:
To demonstrate the existence of the petitioner's parent-like
relationship with the child, the petitioner must prove four
elements: (1) that the biological or adoptive parent consented
to, and fostered, the petitioner's formation and establishment
of a parent-like relationship with the child; (2) that the
petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;
(3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child's care, education
and development, including contributing towards the child's
support, [although the contribution need not be monetary,]
without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) that
the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time
sufficient to have established with the child a bonded,
dependent relationship parental in nature.'79
Both the Pennsylvania and the Wisconsin recognition of the visitation
rights of stepparents rest on an ex post determination. As with the
doctrine of in loco parentis, it is not the mere fact of partnership with
a legal parent that confers parental status. Instead, it is the
recognition of bonding with the child over a period of time, rather
than the moment of marriage itself, that results in an attachment that
may be in the child's best interests to maintain.
The American Law Institute, in its Principles of Family
Dissolution, attempts to provide a comprehensive approach to
stepparent recognition through the recognition of two new categories
of parties entitled to custody upon separation, irrespective of marital
status. '8 The first category involves parents by estoppel. Under the
Principles, parent by estoppel includes, in addition to those with a
good faith belief in biological paternity, those who:
(b)(iii) lived with the child since the child's birth, holding out
and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent,
as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child's
legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents)
to raise a child together each with full parental rights and
responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the
individual as a parent is in the child's best interests; or
179. Holtzman v. Knott (In re H.S.H-K), 533 N.W.2d 419,421 (Wis. 1994), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 975 (1995). But see In re Nelson, 825 A.2d 501 (N.H. 2003)
(refusing to follow Holtzman where partners are unmarried).
180. Am. L. Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and
Recommendations (2002).
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(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out
and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent,
pursuant to an agreement with the child's parent (or, if there
are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds that
recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child's best
interests. '8 '
It also includes, under the definition of a "de facto parent," those who
for a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation,
and with the agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-
child relationship, or as a result of a complete failure or
inability of any legal parent to perform care taking functions,
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking
functions for the child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at
least as great as that of the parent with whom the child
primarily lived.'82
These definitions do not depend on marriage. They do not
depend on an ex ante assumption of responsibilities. They also do
not depend on biology. Instead, they require two things: the
agreement of the legal parent, setting up an estoppel-based
argument,183 and an ex post conclusion that the adult has assumed a
parental role for the requisite period and that recognition is in the
child's best interests. 84
The two categories are, nonetheless, quite different from each
other. Parenthood by estoppel extends parental standing to
individuals who assume parental responsibilities through an
agreement with a legal parent. De facto parents acquire the right to
seek visitation in accordance with their previous involvement in
caretaking. Both of these statuses are dependent on a finding that
they are in the child's best interests. They are clearly designed to
protect the child's interest in a continuing relationship with adults
with whom they have developed an emotional bond. Nonetheless,
they distinguish parents by estoppel, who acquire the full legal rights
of parents, from those adults who may have a right to continued
contact with the child without equal standing with the child's legal
parents.
181. Id. § 2.03(b).
182. Id. § 2.03(c).
183. Id. § 2.03(b)(iii), (iv), (c)(ii).
184. In most cases two years. See id§ 2.03(b)(iv), (c).
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The ALl Principles differ from traditional in loco parentis cases
based upon their emphasis of "a prior co-parenting agreement with
the child's legal parent" in the case of parent's by estoppel' 85 or
"agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship" in
the case of de facto parents.'86 The authors comment: "A parent
cannot be estopped from denying parent status to an individual who
has functioned as such, if that parent did not earlier agree to the
arrangement giving rise to the estoppel."' 87  The emphasis is
accordingly on the adult conduct involved in entering into a
partnership and then reneging on his promises. But the co-parenting
agreements to which the ALI refers are hardly stand alone
agreements limited to parenting. Indeed, to the extent the courts have
addressed the issue of parenthood by agreement, they have rejected
the concept, insisting that intent cannot by itself establish parental
status.188 Instead, such agreements have come in the context of
marriage'89 or in the context of marriage-like relationships, often
where, as in the case of same-sex couples, marriage is unavailable. 90
In 1990, Nancy Polikoff argued for the extension of these
equitable principles to same-sex couples. She observed that:
The mother in Atkinson was not rejecting the institution of
marriage when she asserted sole parental rights to the
exclusion of the rights of her ex-husband. She was merely
invoking traditional legal doctrine to undo the family unit that
she had created for her child. Similarly, the biological
mother in a lesbian-mother family would not be rejecting
lesbian parenthood if she tried to exclude the legally
unrecognized mother from visitation or custody of her child.
185. Id. § 2.03(b)(iii).
186. Id. § 2.03(c)(ii).
187. Id. § 2.03(b)(iv). The Comment further observes:
Agreement, however, may be implied from the circumstances. For
example, the legal father who knows that his child is being raised by the
mother and her husband and who fails to visit or support the child has, by
this conduct, communicated his acceptance of this arrangement and is
estopped from later denying parental status to the stepfather. In contrast,
the legal father who acknowledges the stepfather's role but who continues
to exercise his own parental rights and responsibilities has not agreed to
stepfather's status as the child's parent.
Id.
188. See, e.g., Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 123 (Cal App. 4th 2004),
rev. granted, 97 P.3d 72 (2004).
189. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(husband recognized as equitable parent in spite of the lack of a biological tie where
mother encouraged development of father-son relationship).
190. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d. 419 (Wis. 1995).
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She also would be invoking traditional legal doctrine merely
to dismantle the child's family unit. 191
Polikoffs article influenced the outcome of Holtzman v. Knott.
192
Both the article and the case contributed to the development of the
ALI Principles. But Polikoff's passionate argument was not about
estoppel; it was not about the fairness of the relationship between the
adults. Instead, her plea was for the recognition of the family that had
been created.
iV. CONCLUSION: THE RECREATION OF IDENTITY
It was the relation of the individual to his lineage
(relatives by blood or marriage, dead, living or yet to be
born) which provided a man of the upper classes in a
traditional society with his identity, without which he was a
mere atom floating in a void of social space.
-Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in
England, 1500-1800, 29 (1979)
Stone powerfully links identity to a socially constructed sense of
family. While his conception of lineage, in this era before the
discovery of genes, is closely tied to assumptions about biology, it
just as clearly depends on marriage, and on a selective identification
with potential relatives. Stone's formulation, after all, refers to a man
of the upper classes, and it almost certainly references the law of
inheritance in a society of patrilinear descent and primogeniture.
Societies differ substantially in the construction of family, even
among those that share traditions of patrilineal descent. Teemu
Ruskola 93 observes, for example, that:
In the strictly Confucian view, membership in the lineage
descended in the male line only. Ritually speaking, women
were in effect nonpersons, mere begetters of (male) persons.
Since all household property was owned by the undivided
patrilineage to which women did not belong, they held no
rights of their own to lineage property-although they did
have the right to be supported by their male kinsfolk. The
191. Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining
Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 Geo. L.J. 459, 486 (1990).
192. Holtzman, 533 N.W.2d. at437.
193. Teemu Ruskola, Conceptualizing Corporations andKinship: Comparative




undivided ownership of lineage property among men reflects
in turn the ritual understanding of the patrilineage. As legal
historian Shuzo Shiga explains the father-son bond, "During
the father's lifetime the son's personality is absorbed into the
father's, while after the latter's death his personality is
extended into that of his son. Father and son are a continuum
of the same personality, not two beings in mutual rivalry."'
194
This fusing of father-son identity had legal consequences-Russkola
observes that fathers lacked testamentary powers because they were
seen as trustees for their sons. 195 The legal consequences reinforced
the definition of family; women in many areas could not inherit
because they were seen as members of their husband's, not their
father's, family, and in a patrilineage, property in the hands of
women was property that belonged to a different family line.1 96
Conversely, Jewish law makes the mother's identity central to the
child's religious status. In an article on cloning, Michael Broyde
observes that "in the case of intermarriage, regardless of the father's
religion, Jewish law never recognizes the father as having any rights
or obligations with respect to the child; he is not the legal father.'
197
Moreover, Jewish law posits that "status determinations are
fundamentally immutable and determined at birth."' 98  Broyde
accordingly concludes that, in cases of assisted reproduction, the
sperm donor is the child's father whether he wishes to be or not, and
children cannot be adopted; "they can merely be raised by someone
other than their parents."' 9 9 Within Judaism, the law "discovers"
rather than determines identity.200
While the determination of identity may vary with different
cultures, the child's right to some identity is fundamental. Article 8
of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, for
example, protects "the right of the child to preserve his or her
identity, including nationality, name and family relations."2 1
Barbara Woodhouse recognizes that "[i]dentity itself is a contested
194. Id. at 1627-28.
195. Id. at 1628.
196. See Carole J. Petersen, Equality as a Human Right: The Development of
Anti-Discrimination Law in Hong Kong 34 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 335,339 (1996)
(noting that these traditions were not abolished in the New Territories of Hong
Kong until 1994, and that by then the insular rural societies of the New Territories
were rapidly changing).
197. Michael Broyde, Cloning People: A Jewish Law Analysis of the Issues, 30
Conn. L. Rev. 503, 519-20 (1998).
198. Id. at 507.
199. Id. at 519.
200. Id.
201. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 8, Nov. 20,
1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1456.
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and contextual concept."2 2  She nonetheless cites Masson and
Christine Harrison, who have described identity as "an organizing
framework which holds the past and present together providing some
anticipated shape to future life.
203
This comment demonstrates that the legal determination of
parenthood should be first and foremost about the construction of
identity.21 If parenthood is to be constitutive of the child's identity,
if it is to provide "an organizing framework which holds the past and
present together," it needs a measure of permanence. While identity
is not a static concept, and a child's development involves a
continuous creation and refinement of her sense of herself in
relationship to her caretakers and the community surrounding her,20 5
the sense of who she is should provide a measure of continuity and
stability.
Legal determinations of parenthood, in contrast, too often turn on
the immediate issue before the court. Should a husband who finds
out that he is not the biological father of the child of his wife's that
he has raised since birth be liable for child support even if he never
plans to see the child again? Should the non-biological partner who
jointly undertook the rearing of a child conceived through artificial
insemination be eligible for visitation? Should the mother's act of
reassuring her unmarried partner that he is the child's biological
father affect whether he has standing to seek custody when DNA
tests reveal that he has no biological connection to the child? The
determination of parental status is often used to resolve these issues
in circumstances in which the result has no necessary relationship to
a definition of parenthood constitutive of the child's identity. The
determination of child support may, as in the Buzzanca case,
correctly determine the liability of a man who will never play an
important role in the child's life.
These cases are difficult because the legal system ordinarily
intervenes in the relationship only at its dissolution; that is, at a point
where construction of permanent relationships may be impossible.
In addition, the determination of parenthood has become so painful
because of the confluence of three long term trends in American
society that make instability the norm instead of the exception in
American families. First, divorce rates have risen to one of every two
202. Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 110.
203. Id. (citing Judith Masson & Christine Harrison, Identity: Mapping the
Frontiers, Paper Presented Before the 8th World Congress of the International
Society for Family Law 2 (June 28-July 2, 1994)).
204. See Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 111. "[L]aw is both an active agent in
prescribing, proscribing, and attributing identity, and a public medium for choosing




marriages. 2 6 The marital presumption works reasonably well, even
in an era of DNA testing, for married couples who do not inquire too
closely. It may also be a reasonable presumption for couples who
like Carole and Gerald, elect to stay together. °7 It is less effective
when the husband decides that discovery of his wife's infidelity has
destroyed his relationship with mother and child. Second, non-
marital births have risen to one-third of all births.20 8 While these
fathers may be more likely to be identified than in the Stanley era,
and while more may choose to play a role in the child's life, there is
no necessary correlation between biology and commitment. The
children of these relationships may experience a series of caretakers
over the course of their childhood, with only a few ever eligible for
parental or parent-like status.209 Finally, the growing number and
recognition of same-sex couples has reframed the legal determination
of parenthood in many jurisdictions. Both the ALl principles, and
some of the cases on which they are based, were decided in the
context of committed relationships between intimate partners who
could not marry. Is the idea of consent a proxy for commitment? Is
estoppel a substitute for the marital presumption? Is adoption to be
superceded by presumptions growing out of acknowledgment and
consent? Will the allocation of parental status bear any necessary
relationship to a duty to assume the role?
Reconstructing a legal definition of parenthood that can be
constitutive of identity requires more than simply deciding the
conflicts that reach the courts. It requires reconsidering the
"channeling function" of law, and looking for the pressure points that
can help reconnect moral obligation to the child with the legal
determination of parental status. Accomplishing this will require
working through the following difficult subjects.
A. Biology Matters, Even if it is Not the Only Thing that Matters.
In an era of increasing knowledge about the role of genetics,
biological identity will likely increase in importance. A 1992 federal
study, "Supporting Our Children," observed that "Parentage
determination does more than provide genealogical clues to a child's
background; it establishes fundamental emotional, social, legal and
economic ties between parent and child . . . . Parentage
determination also unlocks the door to government provided
206. Carbone, supra note 1, at 86-87.
207. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989).
208. Carbone, supra note 1, at 49.
209. See Polikoff, supra note 191, at 474-75.
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dependent's benefits, inheritance, and an accurate medical history for
the child."21
Even when the child is unlikely to develop an emotional bond
with the biological parent, knowledge of genetic heritage is likely to
play a role in shaping identity.211 Barbara Woodhouse argues for
recognition of a child's right to identity that includes, in addition to
a right to continued association with those parents with whom the
child has bonded, "a second component, one that becomes more
important as children mature. '  She describes this second
component as a right to claim the child's "identity of origin," that is,
a right to know and explore, commensurate with her evolving
capacity for autonomy, her identity as a member of the family and
group into which she was born."2 '
This right to knowledge of the "identity of origin," is gaining
increasing salience in the adoption context, with many adoptees
pressing for open records, and in the case of artificial insemination by
donor, with a number of countries mandating disclosure of sperm
donor identity when the child turns eighteen.2 4
For identity disclosure to have an impact in cases of family
dissolution, however, biological identity should be determined at
birth. Relationships based on falsehood are unlikely to last.2 15 This
reasoning is consistent with Wendy Kaminer's conclusion that "if the
cornerstone of your identity is a lie, it may be in your best long-term
interest to uncover it."2" 6 One can imagine a hospital scenario where
210. U.S. Comm'n on Interstate Child Support, Supporting Our Children: A
Blueprint for Reform 120 (1992).
211. See, e.g. Nancy E. Dowd, Redefining Fatherhood 213-31 (2000)
(distinguishing between right to knowledge about biological identity and use of
biology to establish paternity).
212. Woodhouse, supra note 13, at 128.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption, Identity, and the
Constitution: The Case For Opening Closed Records, 2 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 150
(1999); Lucy R. Dollens,ArtificialInsemination: Right ofPrivacy andthe Difficulty
in Maintaining Donor Anonymity, 35 Ind. L. Rev. 213 (2001); Gordana Kovacek
Stanic, The Significance ofBiological Parentage in Yugoslav Family Law, 31 Cal.
W. Int'l L.J. 101, 110 (2000) (noting that Sweden and Austria require identity
disclosure in AIDs cases while Yugoslavia does not); Timothy Caulfield, Canadian
Family Law and the Genetic Revolution: A Survey of Cases Involving Paternity
Testing, 26 Queen's L.J. 67, 75-76, 89-90 (2000) (finding evidence ofan increased
trend to recognize a right to genetic identity in Canada and Europe); Anderlik &
Rothstein, supra note 6, at 105 (summarizing literature on disclosure of sperm
donor identity).
215. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining The Parent-
Child Relationship In An Age Of Genetic Certainty, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts.
J. 1011, 1066-70 (2003).
216. Wendy Kaminer, Fathers in Court, Am. Prospect, Oct. 9, 2000, at 62, also
available at http://www.prospect.org/web/printfriendly-view.ww?id=5525 (last
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the proud parents of every newborn compare their DNA profiles with
the child's, looking for similarities and differences. Although issues
will arise in the determination of which genetic conditions should be
the object of such tests, and which might be better left undisclosed,
securing parental identity at birth would have an obvious impact on
the determination of parenthood. Those adults surprised at the lack
of a biological connection would be faced with a decision in the
child's infancy whether or not to assume a parental role. If married
parents or those signing voluntary acknowledgments of paternity
decide to do so, the presumption in favor of their status as parents
should become irrebutable.
2p
B. The Relationship Between the Adults Matters.
In his plurality opinion in Michael H. v. GeraldD., Justice Scalia
observed that:
The family unit accorded traditional respect in our society,
which we have referred to as the "unitary family," is typified,
of course, by the marital family, but also includes the
household of unmarried parents and their children. Perhaps
the concept can be expanded even beyond this, but it will bear
no resemblance to traditionally respected relationships-and
will thus cease to have any constitutional significance-if it
is stretched so far as to include the relationship established
between a married woman, her lover, and their child, during
a 3-month sojourn in St. Thomas, or during a subsequent 8-
month period when, if he happened to be in Los Angeles, he
stayed with her and the child.' 8
Justice Scalia's conception of the unitary family, to which, of course,
he attached constitutional significance, started with the married
family, which he grounded in the "historic respect" accorded to the
relationships that developed within it.219  Particularly given the
Stanley line of cases, he conceded its extension to "the household of
visited May 14, 2005).
217. This proposal is complex and extends well beyond the scope of this article.
The two factors that may ultimately compel such measures are mandatory genetic
testing at birth for disease, and the difficulties with voluntary acknowledgments of
paternity based on deliberate efforts to conceal the identity of the biological fathers.
Nonetheless, the questions of whether the state can mandate such tests, and under
what circumstances that tests should be waivable raise issues that are properly the
subject of lengthy treatment on their own. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 215,
at 1066-70; Anderlik, supra note 6.
218. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.3, 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2342
(1989).
219. Id. at 123, 109 S. Ct. at 2342.
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unmarried parents and their children," but rejected recognition of so
unstable a relationship as that between Carole, Victoria and
Michael.22 °
While much of Justice Scalia's opinion rests on his historical
analysis of the lack of recognition accorded the "adulterous natural
father,, 22 ' his conception of the "unitary family" can be justified
independently. In deciding which fathers have a constitutional right
to a custodial relationship with their children, Justice Scalia
emphasized that "biological fatherhood plus an established parental
relationship" are two "isolated factors" on which to base
222constitutional protection.2 Instead, his conception of the unitary
family seems to require an established family relationship,
presumably one that involves setting up a common household and
making some commitment to the newly created family beyond
visiting when Michael happened to be in town. 23 Janet Dolgin, in
attempting to reconcile Michael H. with the earlier fatherhood cases,
echoes this aspect of Justice Scalia's analysis. She observes: "A
biological father does protect his paternity by developing a social
relationship with his child, but this step demands the creation of a
family, a step itself depending upon an appropriate relationship
between the man and his child's mother.,
224
This analysis has implications that extend beyond the Supreme
Court's willingness to recognize paternal rights. I have argued
elsewhere that in the adoption cases, the relationship between mother,
the father and child is the missing part of the analysis necessary to
protect children's interests.225 But it should also apply to the grant of
parental status to adults without a biological connection to the child.
The ALI, in creating a category of parenthood by estoppel,
extends parental status to individuals who have "lived with the child
since the child's birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent
220. Id. at 124.
221. See Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in which Justice Kennedyjoins,
concurring in all of Justice Scalia's opinion except for footnote 6, in which he
articulates his mode of historical analysis. Id. at 132, 109 S. Ct. at 2346-47
(O'Conner, J., concurring).
222. Id. at 123, 109 S. Ct. 2342 (majority).
223. This is not to say that Justice Scalia's description of the family
relationships in Michael H. is accurate, only that the description of the facts
illustrates his conception of what a unitary family requires. See Carbone & Cahn,
supra note 215, at 1045.
224. Janet L. Dolgin, Just A Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40
UCLA L. Rev. 637, 671 (1993). She commented further that "[tihe relationship
between a father and a child cannot be effected like any relationship between two
autonomous individuals, free to come and go as they agree. A man becomes a
father by relating to his child in the context offamily." Id. at 672.
225. See Carbone, supra note 1 at 164-79.
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responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement
with the child's legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both
parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and
responsibilities. 226 This definition resonates with the part of Justice
Scalia's analysis that emphasizes the establishment of a household.
But it replaces biological paternity with a "co-parenting agreement."
The emphasis on consent is likely to meet potential Troxel objections
in that recognition of non-biological parents without adoption might
otherwise infringe on the rights of legal parents. 227 Nevertheless,
while the ALI does not say so directly, this conception of estoppel
almost certainly anticipates a committed relationship between the
adults-and the creation of a family.
228
The challenge for implementation of both the ALl principles and
the idea of the unitary family more generally will be how to
determine when a family has been created. While many jurisdictions
have been willing to recognize estoppel between married couples,
229
fewer have been willing to extend the principle to unmarried
couples.23° Up until now, recognition of same-sex parents could not
rest on their ability to marry, but with the adoption of same-sex
marriage in Massachusetts, civil unions in Vermont, domestic
partnerships in California and the like, many states will be able to
distinguish between same-sex couples with and without a formal
relationship.23' Should they do so?
Justice Janice Rogers Brown, in her dissent from the California
case approving second-parent adoptions, wished to limit adoptions by
same-sex couples to those registering as domestic partners. She
observed: "The Legislature's insistence that the adopting parent have
a legal relationship with the birth parent reflects the fact that the
adoptive parent's relationship with the child does not exist in a
226. American Law Institute, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution:
Analysis and Recommendations, § 2.03(b) (2002).
227. Compare Emily Buss, "Parental" Rights, 88 Va. L. Rev. 635, 681 (2002)
(arguing that Troxel depends on the legal definition of parenthood) with David D.
Meyer, Constitutional Pragmatism for a Changing American Family, 32 Rutgers
L.J. 711, 714 (2001) (asserting that the plurality's approach amounted "to an
implicit rejection of strict scrutiny" and greater flexibility).
228. The ALl limits its discussion of the inference of consent to cases in which
a non-custodial biological parent does not intervene in the creation of the new
parental relationship. See ALl, supra note 226, at n. 177, cmt. (b)(iv).
229. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
230. See, e.g., In re Nelson, 825 A.2d 501 (N.H. 2003) (rejecting recognition of
unmarried stepparents).
231. Grace Blumberg, one of the reporters responsible for the ALl Principles,
has argued that "same-sex couples have been the dominant force in the movement
to regularize nonmarital cohabitation." Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization
ofNonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare
State, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1265, 1268-69 (2001).
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vacuum but is related to the parents' relationship with each other ....
If the two adults are uncertain whether the second parent will be a
permanent resident of the household, the adoption ought to wait until
they are ready for that commitment." '232 Sharon S. involved the
legality of the ten to 20,000 adoptions that took place before the
legislature authorized domestic partnerships. 233 Restricting adoption
to domestic partners in that case would have destabilized the legal
relationships in a large number of existing families. Brown's point,
however, has greater salience prospectively. Tying parenthood to
formation of the child's identity requires not just the legal parent's
consent to the inclusion of the other adult, but their mutual
commitment to a permanent relationship with the child. That, in turn,
requires a lasting commitment to each other.234
The more difficult application of these principles may well
involve unmarried heterosexual couples. Disputes over voluntary
acknowledgments of paternity often involve adults who have not
made a commitment to each other. The Sheldon case, for example,
involved an acknowledgment by a friend of the mother with no
commitment to the child, and a biological father who lived together
with mother and child for three years without ever seeking to secure
his legal status as a parent.235 The decision to rescind the parental
status of the mother's friend substituted a biological father who had
participated in the creation of a unitary family for a father who was
no more than a name on the form. The failure to recognize Sheldon,
had it occurred, might have posed issues of constitutional
significance.236 What drives these cases, in which the child may well
have no father accepting a permanent obligation, is child support.237
This in turn raises the issue of whether parenthood status should be
232. Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 586-87,2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 737
(Cal. 2003).
233. Id. at 437.
234. See Marsha Garrison's observation that:
Marriage is a public commitment. "In the marriage ceremony the public
recognizes and supports the couple's reciprocal bond, and guarantees that [the
couple's] . . . commitment... will be honored as something valuable not
only to the pair but to the community at large." The couple who exchange
vows "agrees to be subject to a complex set of behavioral expectations
defining the roles of spouse and parent, expectations that will restrict their
freedom and guide their behavior in the relationship."
Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 815 (2005) (citations omitted).
235. County of Los Angeles v. Sheldon P., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 352 (Cal.
App. 2002). He did, however, insist on determining biological paternity. Id.
236. Id. at 1347-48.
237. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 211, at 93. "Economic fatherhood is now the
primary concern of the law." Id.
1340 [Vol. 65
JUNE CARBONE
an all or nothing status, conferred on two and only two adults to the
exclusion of all others.
C. Parental Rights May Need to be Unbundled
The Sharon S. dissent, in trying to restrict adoption to legally
united parents, invoked the specter of multiple parenthood. Justice
Brown observed that:
Parental authority cannot not be divided because it goes
beyond ministerial functions; the parent "direct[s] the child's
activities; . . . make[s] decisions regarding the control,
education, and health of the child; . . . [and exercises] the
duty, to prepare the child for additional obligations, which
includes the teaching of moral standards, religious beliefs,
and elements of good citizenship." . . . Devolving these
responsibilities on a multitude of parties would lead to a
variety of conflicts and inconsistencies . .238
Justice Brown is almost certainly right that custodial responsibilities
cannot be infinitely divided. Indeed, at least part of the basis for the
Supreme Court's decision in Troxel was its recognition that the
Washington statute at issue in the case permitted third parties to
question virtually every element of parental decision-making.239
Yet, separation of the different elements of parental responsibility
does not necessarily entail recognition of equal decision-making
rights. Louisiana's recognition of dual paternity provides an
instructive case in point. In Smith v. Cole,24 the husband and wife
separated, the wife began a relationship with another man and bore
a child before the divorce became final. When the second
relationship dissolved, the mother sued the biological father for child
support. He asserted the marital presumption as a defense. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held:
Louisiana law may provide the presumption that the husband
of the mother is the legal father of her child while it
recognizes a biological father's actual paternity. When the
presumptive father does not timely disavow paternity, he
becomes the legal father. A filiation action brought on behalf
of the child, then, merely establishes the biological fact of
paternity. The filiation action does not bastardize the child or
otherwise affect the child's legitimacy status. The result here
238. Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 586, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 699, 737
(Cal. App. 2003).
239. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67-68, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2061.
240. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847 (La. 1989).
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is that the biological father and the mother share the support
obligations of the child.
24
'
Recognition of the "biological fact of paternity" together with the
husband's status as a legal parent did not needlessly divide the
responsibilities of fatherhood. Instead, it acknowledged the truth of
the child's origins and provided him with more than one guarantor.
On the specific issue of the biological father's obligation for child
support, the case's outcome is no different from those in
Pennsylvania. The child's status as a child of a marriage did not
serve as a shield for a biological parent with an established
relationship with the child.2 4
2
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in its defense of dual paternity,
has cited the same passages as Justice Brown.243 In Gallo v. Gallo,
the opinion also referred to Justice Scalia's passage in Michael H.
about the sum of parental rights. 2" It did so, however, to affirm the
husband's obligation to pay child support even after the mother and
the biological father signed a declaration acknowledging the
biological father's paternity. Again, the outcome differs from those
in other states only in its honesty; the fact that the husband remains
obligated to support a child he helped rear does not alter the facts of
biology, nor give two men simultaneous decision-making authority.
The Louisiana opinions do, however, ratify the moral obligations of
both fathers to the child.245
Other states may be surreptitiously following Louisiana's lead.
In the California case of Jesusa V., a married woman with five
children separated from her husband and had a child with another
man.246 When the child was almost two, the child's father beat the
241. Id. at 855.
242. See, e.g., Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
243. 03-0794, 861 So. 2d 168, 1799 (La. 2003) (discussed in greater detail in
infra note 245).
244. The court noted that parental status "embraces the sum of parental rights
with respect to the rearing of a child, including the child's care; the right to the
child's services and earnings; the right to direct the child's activities; the right to
make decisions regarding the control, education, and health of the child; and the
right, as well as the duty, to prepare the child for additional obligations, which
includes the teaching of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118-19, 109 S. Ct. 2333,
2339-40 (1989), cited in Gallo v. Gallo, 03-0794, 861 So. 2d 168, 179 (La. 2003).
245. Indeed, the Gallo court emphasizes that the community property tradition
in Louisiana recognizes a child support obligation based on marriage that goes
considerably beyond the common law tradition. 861 So. 2d at 179. "Louisiana's
Civil Law tradition, from its French and Spanish beginnings, provided for the
parental obligation of child support. The Common Law did not have such an
auspicious beginning." Id.
246. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
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mother, requiring her hospitalization. The father was arrested and
sentenced to jail, with a deportation order to follow. The husband,
with the mother's support, sought custody of the six children. The
California Supreme Court concluded that the child had two presumed
fathers, and that it could pick the one "which on the facts is founded
on the weightier considerations of policy and logic. 2 4  Unlike
Louisiana, the California Supreme Court insisted, that at the end of
the day, the child could have only one presumed father. It
nonetheless observed, "[T]here is so much more to being a father
than merely planting the biological seed. The man who provides the
stability, nurturance, family ties, permanence, is more important to
a child than the man who has mere biological ties.... By finding
[Paul] is the presumed father, this court is protecting and preserving
a family unit, the integrity of a family unit. 248 Only by recognizing
multiple fathers and picking the one that offered the best prospects
for "stability, nurturance, family ties, permanence" could the court
link parental status with the child's need for a sustainable identity.249
Conversely, the stepparent cases, at least those involving adults
who marry the legal parent of an older child, should be resolved
without invoking parental status at all. The ALI's category of de
facto parenthood does not require revocation of any other parent's
legal status, and does not allow for an award of custody. Instead, it
recognizes the child's ties with another adult through the limited
award of visitation.5 It nonetheless seeks to preserve the emotional
bonds that may still be strong at the time of separation while
deferring to the primacy of the legal parent's relationship with the
child. It is a misguided notion of equality, or all or nothing
parenthood, that undermines more realistic recognition of the
stepparent role.25'
The challenge in future cases will be to unpack the elements of
parenthood in ways that encourage adults to accept parental
responsibility. Marriage involves an unmistakable exchange of
247. Id. at 2, 11.
248. Id. at 7-8.
249. It is important to emphasize that this case did not rest on either the strict
application of the marital presumption, since the separation had occurred before the
pregnancy, or estoppel. Instead, the important part of the ruling was the court's
conclusion that proof of paternity did not rebut presumed fatherhood status in itself
Id. at 19.
250. See ALl, supra note 226, § 2.03(c).
251. It is striking that the vast majority of post-Troxel cases address grandparent,
not stepparent rights. See Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn't
Know Best: Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference after Troxel v. Granville, 88
Iowa Law Review 865 (2003).
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promises and commitment.252 The threshold to parenthood is
dramatically lower. Yet, both should involve a substantial and
permanent commitment to the child. It is difficult for this to happen
if the commitment is based on a lie, or if the parents are not also
making a commitment to each other. Louisiana, in its recognition of
dual paternity, emphasizes the assumption of responsibilities that
come both with marriage and with biological paternity.23 Perhaps
the time has come to initiate a ceremony modeled on christening.
Shortly after the child's birth, the parent or parents committing
themselves to the child's future should join in establishing a
permanent identity. Married couples should reaffirm their
commitment to each other as well as marking, in a public way, their
independent commitments to the child. Unmarried couples who are
undertaking family obligations should celebrate the occasion publicly
as well as in the private documents necessary to establish parentage.
If marriage can no longer constitute the sole method of creating
legally recognized families, then the obligation to children should
compel its own ceremonies and celebrations.
252. Garrison, supra note 234, at 872 ("legally recognized commitments are
extraordinarily meaningful to those who make them").
253. See, e.g., Gallo v. Gallo, 03-0794, 861 So. 2d 168, 177 (La. 2003), citing
La. Civ. Code art. 227 (1993). "Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying,
contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their
children." Id. Thus, proof of birth during marriage establishes the obligation of
support. See also Smith v. Cole, 553 So.2d 847, 854 (La. 1989). "The presumed
father's acceptance of paternal responsibilities, either by intent or default, does not
enure to the benefit of the biological father. It is the fact of biological paternity or
maternity which obliges parents to nourish their children. The biological father
does not escape his support obligations merely because others may share with him
the responsibility." Id.
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